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I. Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the People's Republic of China
(China)' has witnessed an explosion of economic development and
legal reform. In the process, the issue of international intellectual
property rights protection has risen to the political forefront and
stirred the landscape of world trade. On February 26, 1995, after
eleven days of intensive talks and eight months of negotiations, Chi-
nese and U.S. officials ceased the impending threat of a trade war by
signing an agreement which outlines the steps that the Chinese gov-
ernment must take immediately to curb the widespread copyright in-
fringement and piracy of U.S. products.2 This hallmark agreement
between the United States and China will effectively boost bilateral
trade3 and will usher both nations into a new trading era.
U.S. trade officials, optimistic about the agreement and satisfied
with the results, are apprehensive that the pact may be rendered inef-
fective by China's failure to enforce and carry out its provisions-a
failure it has shown in the past. Charlene Barshefsky, the Deputy U.S.
Trade Representative that headed the U.S. negotiating team, recog-
nized the magnitude of the recent events and remarked that the pact is
"the single most comprehensive and detailed intellectual property
rights enforcement agreement that the U.S. has ever concluded."4
Nevertheless, in the same statement she noted that this agreement is
only the first step towards building a successful and profitable trade
relationship with China.5
The road leading to this agreement was not easy. In the' begin-
ning, China's weak legal system had an almost nonexistent intellectual
property rights system and no framework of laws to protect against vio-
lations. Subsequently, as China began to open its doors to interna-
tional trade, it soon found itself on the brink of its first trade war with
the United States because of its inability to protect U.S. goods from the
growing number of Chinese intellectual property pirates. On January
17, 1992, the United States and China entered into an agreement,
known as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 6 This pact was
the first of its kind in recent history to deal with the imposition and
enforcement of intellectual property rights within China.7 Pursuant to
this agreement, China made efforts to improve its legal framework for
I "China" refers to the People's Republic of China as distinguished from Taiwan or the
Republic of China.
2 U.S.-China Reach Accord on 'Pirated' Goods, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Mar. 2,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The items covered by the agreement




6 See infra part V.B.
7 See infra part V.B.
[VOL. 20
CHINESE COPYRIGHT LAW
intellectual property rights, including copyright infringement and
computer software protection. The Chinese government adopted
many of the laws and regulations of the major world players, including
such precepts of western law as intellectual property protection.8
In his address to the deputies of the Eighth National People's
Congress, Ren Jianxin, President of the Supreme People's Court, re-
ported that recent years have been marked by progress in the legisla-
tive and judicial protection of intellectual property rights.9 He added
that in addition to joining many international conventions, China has
formed a new and modern legal system that protects intellectual prop-
erty rights and enforces newly adopted international standards. 10
Moreover, China has established special tribunals within the Chinese
judicial system, such as the new Intellectual Property Court.'" One
commentator has suggested that "China has accomplished in a decade
what took many countries several decades to achieve: the establish-
ment of a modern intellectual property protection system." 12 How-
ever, in reality, China has struggled with this new rule of law, and
according to U.S. trade officials, many of the initial changes have
proven to be inadequate. 13
Despite these newly created laws, only a fraction of the violations
within China ever made it to Chinese courts; furthermore, the cases
that were heard had low success rates, and successful litigants usually
did not receive adequate or just rewards.' 4 This lackluster enforce-
ment by the Chinese government helped to create a widespread epi-
demic of piracy of U.S. products. Almost twenty months ago, after
many failed attempts by U.S. corporations to pursue enforcement and
retribution, the U.S. government stepped in to try to contain the con-
flict between the corporations and the Chinese.
Mickey Kantor, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), initiated a
8 Laurence P. Harrington, Recent Amendments to China's Patent Law: The Emperor's New
Clothes, 17 B.C. Ir'L & Comp. L. Ra,. 337, 339 (1994).' See alojeanette L. Pinard, Patent
Protection Under Chinese Law, 1 J. CHINESE L. 69, 90-91 (1987).
9 China to Enhance Protection of Intelectual Property Rights, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 13,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Enhance Protection].
10 Id.
11 Id. In Ren Jianxin's estimation, the Intellectual Property Court heard 1,662 intellec-
tual property rights-related cases in 1994 alone. Id. The court, actually designated the Intel-
lectual Property Rights Chamber, was formed as a division of the Beijing Intermediate
People's Court specifically to handle intellectual property rights cases. See infra part II.C.3.
12 Xiao-Lin Zhou, U.S.-China Trade Dispute and China's Intellectual Property Rights Protec-
tion, 24 N.Y.U.J. IN-r'L L. & POL. 1115, 1128 (1992). According to this commentator, China
has stepped up its efforts to improve intellectual property protection in recent months in
response to U.S. concerns. Id.
13 See infra part V.B. According to commentators, China has "never been a dedicated
free-trader." Right to Punish China, ECONoMisr, February 11, 1995, at 15. At the end of 1994,
after eight years of discussions, China had made so few meaningful reforms that it failed to
win a place in GATT or GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Id.
14 See infra part IV.
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Special 30115 investigation against China on June 30, 1994.16 In De-
cember 1994, in an effort to avoid a multi-million dollar trade war, U.S.
trade officials briefly extended the six month deadline prescribed
under the Special 301 provision, and on February 20, 1995, Charlene
Barshefsky traveled to China to meet with Wu Yi, Minister of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation. 17 Because China may constitute
the world's largest remaining potential market for the twenty-first cen-
tury, this meeting, which led to an agreement on February 26, was one
of the most important events in international intellectual property
rights in recent history.1 8
The events of the last year have proven that the Chinese are no
longer content to exist in an isolationist environment. 19 As a nation,
China has begun to take significant steps to ensure both its sovereignty
and its integration into the world economy, including membership in
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 2 0 In response, the United
States will continue to monitor the Chinese to make sure they are able
to comply with the rules of international trade. The recently signed
agreement proves that the ability to impose trade sanctions gives the
United States the power it needs to maintain this oversight position.
China can no longer debate whether respect for law and equal justice
15 Special 301 is a mechanism provided in the Trade Act of 1974 that allows U.S. trade
officials to warn and sanction nations that continue to violate international intellectual prop-
erty rights. See infra part V.B. Special 301 poses the significant threat of unilateral trade
retaliation against countries with inadequate intellectual property protection, and often the
mere threat of a Special 301 investigation will persuade a nation to accede to U.S. demands.
Brent Sadler, Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade, 14 Hous. J. INTrL L.
393, 413-15 (1992).
16 Summary by US. Trade Representative of US.-China Intellectual Property Accord Released Feb.
26, 1995, [July-December] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 442 (Mar. 1, 1995) [hereinafter
Summary]. U.S. trade officials have met with Chinese government officials 22 times since July
1993, eight times in 1994 (five since initiation of the Special 301 proceedings). See infra part
V.B.
17 Summary, supra note 16. These talks began on the "official" level in Beijing on Febru-
ary 13, 1995, after nine days of previous negotiations which had ended unsuccessfully on
January 28, 1995. Id.
18 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Wu Yi acknowledged that many Chinese
officials have privately hoped that the U.S. would be able to ensure enforcement of China's
copyright laws. Making War on China's Pirates, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 1995, at 33. However,
these officials also are concerned about China's ability to maintain its national sovereignty.
Id. at 33-34.
19 Janiece Marshall, Current Developments in the People's Republic of China: Has China
Changed, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 505, 506-07 (1988). China's policy of isolationism, in the past,
has been reinforced by a deep-seated commitment to traditionalism which ultimately pre-
vented any foreign country from having a meaningful impact on the Chinese economy. Id.
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party's Central Committee of the People's
Republic of China adopted a policy of reform and opened China's doors to the outside
world-the "Open Door" Policy. Id. at.n.1.
20 One of China's primary motivations in coming to terms with the United States over
intellectual property rights has been to get U.S. support for their entry into the WTO, which
came into being as the successor of GATT onJanuary 1, 1995. This desire on the part of the




will hinder its incredible economic growth,21 but instead must use its
efforts to enforce the laws and strengthen the new legal framework
designed for the protection of international intellectual property
rights.
This Comment will discuss the development of the Copyright Law
and Software Regulations in China and how these laws have affected
international trade. Part II will begin by exploring the 1991 Copyright
Law,22 which emerged amidst political reforms and economic changes
as China began to break from a culture which has historically avoided
recognition of property rights and mistrusted intellectuals. 23 Part III
will analyze the Software Regulations, a supplement to the 1991 Copy-
right Law, which have grown from the multitude of issues that con-
tinue to surround this dynamic and technical industry. Part IV will
begin to tie these two important pieces of legislation together through
a discussion of recent cases and decisions that have arisen from the
enforcement of these new laws within China. Part V will discuss how
these new laws and the Chinese government's inability to enforce them
has affected the trade relationship between the United States and
China and the international trade environment as a whole. Part VI will
conclude with a discussion on how past and recent events will shape
the scope of international trade and intellectual property rights pro-
tection for the United States, China, and other major countries around
the world for many years to come.
II. Copyright Law
A. Introduction
It was not until recently that a Western lawyer had to concern him-
self with Chinese intellectual property laws when doing business in
China. Copyright protection, in particular, was basically nonexistent,
because the laws were loosely constructed and rarely enforced. During
recent legal reforms, copyright law was the last area addressed by the
government, despite historical evidence which credits the Chinese with
being the first people to produce printed material by using movable
21 Ideas Follow Trade, INT'L HERALD TpuB., Mar. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File.
22 All references to Chinese legal documents in this comment, including the 1991 Copy-
right Law and the Software Regulations, are taken from English-language secondary sources.
Note that the official Chinese-language documents are the authoritative versions of these
legal documents.
23 See Brian Barron, Chinese Patent Legislation in Cultural and Historical Perspective, 6 IN-
TELL. PROP. J. 313, 330 (1991). According to this commentator,
[t] he concept of individuals holding exclusive rights in an article of intellectual
property, as well as the 'money-seeking' tendencies and excessive individualism
such rights might foster, are troublesome for a society with a traditionally low
tolerance for rapacious profit-seeking and a long political tradition favouring
state control over individual enterprise.
1995]
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type on manufactured writing paper.24 Until the emergence of
China's "Open Door Policy" in the early 1980s, the Chinese cultural
and political systems served as barriers to an effective intellectual prop-
erty protection system. 25 Although copyright law dates as far back as
1068, with the rise of printing during the Tang Dynasty,26 formal laws
often have been little more than superficial because enforcement of
such regulations was not a priority for the Chinese government. How-
ever, the impetus toward reform has begun. Over the last fifteen years,
the relationship between the Chinese government and Chinese intel-
lectuals has improved and may prove to be an important catalyst for
change in the international trade arena.27
In an effort to recognize the rules and needs of the world's most
prominent trading countries, China has gone to great lengths to incor-
porate accepted international copyright norms into its new copyright
laws. In addition to drafting innovative and modern legal language,
China joined major international treaties and organizations that re-
quire member countries to adopt certain laws and regulations. For
example, as of October 1992, China had joined both the Universal
Copyright Convention 28 and the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works29 administered by the World Intellectual
24 Edward G. Durney, Copyright Law in China and Taiwan, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SERIES 1993: PROTECrING TRADEMARKS AND COMPRIGHTS-SUCcESSFUL STRATEGIES
311, 314 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Se-
ries No. 367, 1993).
25 Xiao-Lin, supra note 12, at 1118.
26 Durney, supra note 24, at 312 (citing Guo Shoukang, China, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CoPY-
RIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE § I[I] (Paul Edward Geller ed., 1992)).
27 One of the primary reasons that it took so long to formulate a Chinese copyright law
was the long history of mistrust between the state and Chinese intellectuals. Mark Sidel,
Copyright, Trademark, and Patent Law in the People's Republic of China, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 259, 288
(1986). Following the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the relationship between the
two groups improved, and China was able to promulgate strong intellectual property laws.
Id. at 288-89.
28 Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178
[hereinafter UCC]. The UCC is administered by the United Nations and provides minimum
standards for adequate and effective copyright protection. Id. at art. I. Under the UCC,
authors enjoy the rights to the reproduction (by any means), public performance, and broad-
casting of their works. Id. at art. IV. The term of protection for works under the UCC is the
life of the author plus twenty-five years. Id. The treaty protects the rights of authors in liter-
ary, scientific, and artistic works, including writings, paintings, engravings, sculpture, and
musical, dramatic, and cinematographic works. Id. at art. I. Finally, an author enjoys these
rights in his own territory and that of any contracting state that is a member of the UCC. Id.
at art. II.
29 The Berne Copyright Convention refers to the Convention for the Protection of Lit-
erary and Artistic Works, signed at Berne, Switzerland, on September 8, 1886. The Conven-
tion provides two principal, conditions:
1) That Berne Union authors enjoy, for works protectible under the Conven-
tion, in Union countries "other. than the country of origin," the rights which
their respective laws grant to their nationals (reciprocal national treatment), as
well as the rights "specially granted" by the Convention; and 2)That the enjoy-
ment and exercise of such rights "shall not be subject to any formality."
Thomas T. Moga, Recent Intellectual Property Developments in Japan, Taiwan, and China, 70 U.
CHINESE CoPyRiGHT LAw
Property Organization (WIPO).30 ByJune 1993, China had joined the
Geneva Phonograms Convention as well. 3 1 As a result, China's new
copyright law is one of the most comprehensive copyright laws in the
world.32
B. History
1. 1910-1949: The Road to Mao and Communist China
Historically, China has been credited with dominating world pro-
gress in scientific and technological areas.33 However, a rigid culture
and the prevalence of Confucian ideology, which places a strong em-
phasis on development for the good of society rather than personal
reward, hindered China from reaping the economic benefits of intel-
lectual discoveries or breakthroughs.34 Very early on, China was
placed on a vastly different course than its western counterparts, one
immersed in a sense of superiority that stunted economic growth.3 5
This same ideology forced the Chinese to focus on the value of public
recognition and not on a standard of legal protection for intellectual
property.3 6 For many decades, any significant economic development
DET. MERcY L. REv. 313, 324 n.84 (1993) (citations omitted). See also HENRY G. HENN, 1989
SUPPLEMENT TO COPYIGHT LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 4 (1989).
30 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an
international organization whose members include Japan and the United States, and its ob-
jective is to "promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world and to
ensure administrative cooperation among [member] states." H.1. REP. No. 609, 100th
Corg., 2d Sess. 11, 13 (1988).
31 Moga, supra note 29, at 324. This international organization governs the copyright
protection and dissemination of sound recordings and other audio-related works. See geer-
al Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Dupli-
cation of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S. 67.
32 See infra part II.C.
33 See, e.g., JOHN KING FAIRRANK, CHINA A NEW HISTORY (1992). The Chinese are
credited with such innovations as paper, the compass, and gunpowder. Id. In the Middle
Ages (1000-1500 A.D.), China was well ahead of the rest of the world in technological and
industrial innovation, and only its geographical constraints, agrarian economy, and political
structure prevented these inventions from greatly influencing the national culture or econ-
omy. Id.
34 Commentators note that lying at the core of traditional Chinese society's treatment
of intellectual property was the dominant Confucian vision of the nature of civilization. Id.
The dominant Confucian vision saw civilization as defined by a set of relationships with recip-
rocal responsibilities and expectations that the parties were morally bound to fulfill. Id. The
belief that personal moral growth is a direct result of past actions dictated the understanding
that all Chinese should have broad access to the intellectual and physical works that comprise
everyone's common heritage. See William P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking About... Yesterday:
Why There Was No Indigenous Counterpart To Intellectual Property Law In Imperial China, 7J. CHI-
NESE L. 3, 21 (1993).
35 The Chinese people believed that they did not need either economic, political, or
social influences from the outside world. See Marshall, supra note 19, at 505. As a result, they
did not study other cultures or trade goods with other nations, but instead chose to remain
an agrarian society with no meaningful foreign relations for centuries. Id. at 505-06.
36 Barton, supra note 23, at 326-27; see also William E. Beaumont, The New Patent Law of
the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.): Evidence of a Second Chinese "Renaissance, 27 IDEA 39, 44
(1988).
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in China was hindered by a deeply-rooted resistance to modernization
because of its perceived association with "foreignism," a cultural ideol-
ogy based on traditionalism and isolationism, and an avoidance of the
concept of individual property rights. 3 7 Ultimately, this Confucian ide-
ology, set against the backdrop of foreign exploitation and a preemi-
nent state interest, led to the welcoming of the Marxist economic
system later introduced by the Chinese Communist Party.38
Historically, the legal system in China was centered around the
Emperor and was based on a blend of dynastic codes with Confucian
ethical principles.3 9 The Confucian ethical system was not based on
conflict resolution, but instead focused on a system of conciliation and
compromise in which a neutral observer (judge) would make a unilat-
eral decision based on the relevant evidence presented by the feuding
parties.40 Each dynasty promulgated their own codes of law. In 1910,
the first of three copyright statutes was enacted by the government of
the Qing Dynasty during the reign of the last feudal emperor,
Xuantong (1909-1912).41 The Copyright Law of the Great Qing was
comprehensive, with fifty-five articles in five chapters protecting works
of literature and art, pamphlets, calligraphy, photographs, sculptures,
and models. 4 2 The law stated that any party convicted of counterfeit-
ing a work created by another or willfully selling counterfeited works
would be fined and required to compensate the artist for damages,
and the government would confiscate the plates and other instruments
used to counterfeit the works. 43 However, this extensive law was never
implemented completely because the Qing Government subsequently
was overthrown by the Northern Warlords Government (1912-1927)
who revised the statute in 1915. 44 In 1928, the last formal copyright
statute was promulgated by the Nationalist (Guomindang) Govern-
ment (1912-1949). 45 This law remained in effect until 1949, when the
Chinese Communist Party rose to power and destroyed all existing
37 Marshall, supra note 19, at 507.
38 Harrington, supra note 8, at 342. See also Barron, supra note 23, at 326-27; Beaumont,
supra note 36, at 44.
39 LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA: THE TESTAMENT OF A CHINA-WATCHER
34-35 (1992).
40 ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DisPUTs SETTLEMENT IN CHINA ch. 1 (1985).
41 Durney, supra note 24, at 314.
42 Song Muwen, Letter from China, 27 ZHUZUOQUAN [COPYRIGHT] 43 (1991). The
works not protected are laws, orders, official documents, speeches delivered at various reli-
gious ceremonies, news on politics and current events published in newspapers, and public
speeches. Id.
43 Id. at 44. Also, anyone who distorted or mutilated a work created by another, or
distributed a work without mentioning the name of the author or the title of the work would
be fined. Id. The law also provided for ownership of the copyright, inheritance of the copy-
right, works of joint authorship, commissioned works, oral works, and translations. Id.
44 Durney, supra note 24, at 314.
45 Yiping Yang, The 1990 Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, 11 U.C.LA PAC.
BASINJ. 260, 262 (1993) (citing Muwen Song, Zhongguo de banquan baohu [Copyright Protection
in China], 2 ZHUZUOQUAN [COPYRIGHT] 1 (1991)).
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copyright and publications laws.4 6
2. 1949-1979: The Road to the Cultural Revolution
In 1949, Mao Tse-tung took control of China and expelled two
forces crucial to intellectual property development from the state: (1)
all foreign influence, and (2) any formal copyright law.4 7 The Com-
munist Party promised the people a better life by freeing China from
its economic backwardness and lack of modernization. 48 The new gov-
ernment made many changes in the laws and economic structure; as a
result, the law and the judicial system became secondary to state inter-
est and government policy.49 By the 1950s, copyright provisions in
China existed primarily as administrative orders or internal regulations
that merely governed the system of remuneration between authors and
publishers.50 In 1950, the new government implemented Article 17 of
the Resolution on the Improvement and Development of Publishing
Work, which was adopted at the First National Publishing Conference
in Beijing in October 1950.51 This Article stipulated that the rights of
publication and copyright were to be respected-such that the acts of
unauthorized reprinting, plagiarism, and mutilation were prohib-
ited.52 Sometime later, the Resolution on the Correction of Unauthor-
ized Reprinting of Books was issued by the National Publishing
Administration Organization, and it prohibited unauthorized re-
printing of books and pictures by any institution.53
However, these publishing regulations were ad hoc, informal, lim-
ited, and in no way as expansive as their copyright predecessors. 4
During the Communist reign, the concept of law in China was weak,
and there were neither administrative mechanisms in place to enforce
46 Sidel, supra note 27, at 261 (citing SHEN REN'GAN & ZHONG YINGKE, BAN-
QUANFA QUIANTAN [A DISCUSSION OF COPYRIGHT LAw] 100-04 (1982) (this author's trans-
lation of title) (Chinese copy on file with the Texas International Law Journal)).
47 Maurice Meisner, Marxism and Chinese Values, in THE CHINA DIFFERENCE, 99, 101-06
(Ross Terrill ed., 1979).
48 Marshall, supra note 19, at 508.
49 See Roy J. Girasa, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in China, 20 WESTCH EsrER BAR J. 305
(1993), available in WESTLAW, Jir Database. After the Communist Party abolished all laws
enacted by the previous government, judges were forced to decide any new cases in accord-
ance with governmental policy. Id. at *2. From 1958 to 1966, no laws were passed, but 420
decrees were enacted. LADANY, supra note 39, at ch. 3.
50 Yiping, supra note 45, at 263.
51 Sidel, supra note 27, at 261.
52 Muwen, supra note 42, at 44.
53 Id. This organization was created by the Chinese government to ensure that the legit-
imate rights of authors were to be respected and the copyrights were to be protected from
illegal use. Id. The government hoped that this protection and the guarantee of fixed sala-
ries would provide a more creative climate for its authors. Id. Unfortunately, this system of
remuneration and reward was dismantled during the Cultural Revolution. Id. See supra part
II.B.2.
54 MICHAEL D. PENDLETON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA: A GUIDE TO PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 39 (1986).
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the copyright regulations nor remedies to apply to violations. 55 In re-
ality, according to international standards, China did not possess a true
copyright law until 1990.56 Therefore, since Communist China lacked
both a developed legal system and a formal copyright law for forty-one
years, incidents of intellectual property piracy were abundant.
Although intellectual property rights laws were not strictly en-
forced by the Chinese during these years, they did not ignore the sub-
ject completely. Over the next decade, out of concern for authors and
their protection, the government developed a system of publishing
contracts to regulate the relationship between authors and publish-
ers.57 New contract-based regulations on book and periodical publish-
ing and printing granted citizens remuneration for their creativity.58
For example, a per-word and per-copy royalty system was formulated
for authors and publishers.59 Yet in 1957, Chinese culture and Con-
fucian ideology regained prominence, and Chinese officials reduced
the per-word and per-copy royalty payments to authors and translators
in order to bridge the income gap between mental and manual la-
bor.60 Ultimately, this contract system failed to protect copyrights be-
cause it could not control unauthorized reproduction by third parties
effectively. 61 These regulations and remuneration standards were dis-
mantled completely during the ten-year long Cultural Revolution.
During the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, the state blocked
the production of any new creative work in China, once again evidenc-
ing a policy towards intellectuals of mistrust and antagonism. The
works previously protected under the contract system for copyrights
were taken over by the government, and the rights to publish and re-
ceive royalties were abolished. 62 These actions led to widespread in-
fringement and left intellectual property protection in disarray.
3. 1977-1986: On the Road to Copyright Protection
Following the Cultural Revolution, China was faced with a falter-
ing economy and an ineffective and unproductive bureaucratic system
plagued by unfulfilled demand and an overall dissatisfaction with the




59 Mark Sidel, The Legal Protection of Copyright and the Right of the Authors in the People's
Republic of China, 1949-1984: Prelude to the Chinese Copyright Law, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 477,
479-87 (1985).
60 Id. at 486. The combination of per-word and per-copy royalties resulted in relatively
large payments to authors, because royalties were not limited to a one-time payment. Sidel,
supra note 27, at 263. However, the payment of high royalties to authors ended in 1958, after
Mao and his supporters launched the Great Leap Forward to quicken the Chinese transition
to socialism. Id.
61 Sidel, supra note 27, at 262.
62 Id. at 264.
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state of affairs.63 After Mao's death in 1976, the new Communist lead-
ers, Deng Xiaoping and his allies, began a course for change that
rested on the belief that China would never reach economic equality
with the western world without increased application of modern tech-
nology to all sectors of the economy.64 The Constitution of China,
promulgated in 1982, stipulated in Article 47, Chapter 2 that the state
would support and encourage all citizens to create works that were
conducive to the development of culture and science and that were
beneficial to the interests of the country. 65 China began to develop
new intellectual property laws that reflected the efforts of a nation try-
ing to restructure its economic system.
To facilitate foreign investment, China was forced to recognize
the value of a legal and economic system based on individual wealth; as
a result, the government began to create a more stable legal system for
the protection of intellectual property rights. 66 Also, as the People's
Congress became invigorated, legislation was passed which gave credi-
bility to the "new rule of law" in China.6 7 The Ministry of Justice was
reestablished in 197 9 ,68 and new laws began to reflect China's entry
into the global marketplace. China "essentially abandoned Marxist ec-
onomics in favor of a dual system . . ., a one-party autocratic political
system, coupled with a government-assisted free market economy."6 9
During these transitional years, the government began to formulate
the first drafts of the long-awaited Copyright Law of 1991.
Prior to the promulgation of the Copyright Law, the Chinese gov-
ernment issued one of its most important administrative regulations,
the 1984 Regulation, which soon was adopted by the National Copy-
right Administration of China (NCAC) and the Ministry of Culture.70
The Regulation embodied the principle of "to each according to his
labor," as stated in Article I, and it was designed to foster intellectual
creation by protecting the legitimate rights of authors and transla-
tors.71 The right of publication, the right of translation, the ownership
of copyrights, and even the protection of the economic rights of for-
63 See Marshall, supra note 19, at 508 n.14.
64 Id. at 509.
65 Muwen, supra note 42, at 44. The Chinese government offered artists and writers
appropriate jobs and fixed salaries, which became their basic guarantee of livelihood and
renumeration and encouraged the creative climate. Id.; see also XIANFA [Constitution] ch. 2,
at art. 47 (1982) (P.R.C.).
66 Marshall, supra note 19, at 527-28 n.150.
67 See Girasa, supra note 49, at *2.
68 Id. (citing Du XICHUAN & ZHANG LINGYuAN, CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL SUR-
vEY 22 (1990)). By reestablishing the Ministry ofJustice, ajudicial office within the Chinese
system of government, the state reignited the People's Congress and the interest in legisla-
tion and law-making. Id. The entire movement signalled that the Chinese government was
now ready to interact with global and local forces on a modern and more widespread scale.
Id.
69 Id. at *1.
70 Muwen, supra note 42, at 45.
71 Id.
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eigners were included within this administrative order.72 However,
with the rapid changes taking place within China, this regulation was
soon ineffective to meet ever growing demands. In 1979, with prod-
ding and support from the Chinese government, a Copyright Study
Group was developed within the Publishers Association of China to an-
alyze the primary international copyright conventions and copyright
laws of other major countries. 73
In July 1985, the NCAC was given the power to facilitate the pro-
gress of modern copyright legislation. 74 The group became responsi-
ble for a draft of the new law, administration of the copyright
procedures, collection and dissemination of copyright knowledge, and
the handling of international concerns on behalf of the Chinese gov-
ernment. 75 In 1986, the first draft of the new law was submitted for
review to the Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council, and
after several revisions, the Director General of the NCAC successfully
pushed the draft law through the Standing Meeting of the State Coun-
cil on December 14, 1989.76 Shortly thereafter, the draft was submit-
ted officially to the 11th Session of the Standing Committee of the
Seventh National People's Congress where it was reviewed and
adopted.77
Two major legal bases for this copyright legislation were the Gen-
eral Principles of the Constitution and the General Principles of the
Civil Code. First, Articles 19 through 24 of the General Principles of
the Constitution outlined that the state has a right to develop and pro-
tect scientific, cultural, and educational developments. 78 Along these
lines, the state should encourage and assist citizens in research and
creations that ultimately would benefit the state.79 Second, in 1986,
the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National
People's Congress passed the General Principles of the Civil Code,
which provided special legal rights to the authors of literary, artistic,
and scientific works. 80 Specifically, Articles 94 and 118 stated that citi-
zens and legal entities are granted copyright protection, including the
72 ld.
73 d. This group was responsible for analyzing the international copyright laws and
treaties in order to draft a more comprehensive copyright law in China. Id.
74 The National Copyright Administration of China (NGAC) was established by the




77 Id. During this process, the NCAC established long-term cooperative relations with
the WIPO and other international organizations concerned with copyright protection as well
as the copyright institutions of a number of countries. Id. A friendly relationship developed
during the process of copyright legislation. d.
78 XIANFA [Constitution] at arts. 19-24 (1982) (P.R.C.) (General Principles of the
Constitution).
79 Id.
80 Muwen, supra note 42, at 46; see also General Principles of the Civil Law, Law No. 346
(1986) (P.R.C.), available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Chinal File.
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right of authorship, the right of publication, and the right to receive
remuneration thereof.8' Any infringement of such rights required the
cessation of the infringing act, the elimination of the effects of the
infringing act, and compensation to the artist for damages incurred.8 2
As the creation of the official Copyright Law of China drew closer,
it became clear that the underlying impetus for the legislation was a
modern blend of the promotion of socialist culture and scientific ad-
vancement through the protection of legitimate rights of individual
creators.83 In addition, the promulgation of an effective copyright law
would facilitate the exchange of technology between China and other
major western countries, a result China seemed very eager to achieve
within its new socialist modernization movement. In its final form, the
new Copyright Law of China appears to have satisfied many of these
goals.
C. The Copyright Law of China
1. In General
The Copyright Law of China (Copyright Law or Law) was formally
introduced after twenty drafts and eleven years.84 According to one
Chinese scholar, the new law is "likely [to be] the most up-to-date and
perhaps the most fair copyright legislation in the world."85 From its
inception, the Copyright Law has been a mix of politics and ideology.
The law has attempted to provide private rights for a socialist purpose
within the context of a socialist government framework and a fledgling
market economy. 86 In its current form, the new law should be equal
or even superior to the copyright laws of other developed nations, be-
cause many of the precepts, standards, and needs of the world's major
players have been integrated in its creation.87
At the present time, the official Copyright Law of China contains
six chapters with fifty-six articles. The Law took effect together with
the NCAC's Implementing Regulations on June 1, 1991.88 The Imple-
menting Regulations themselves contain seven chapters and fifty-six ar-
ticles.89 Within the six chapters of the Copyright Law, nine categories
81 General Principles of the Civil Law, supra note 80, at arts. 94, 118.
82 Id.
83 Muwen, supra note 42, at 46.
84 Durney, supra note 24, at 315; seeChinese Copyright Law, arts. 1- 56 (1991) (P.R.C.),
reprinted in Copyright and Neighboring Rights Laws and Treaties, supplement to 27 COPY-
RIGHT, 2-01 p.1 (No. 2, Feb. 1991) [hereinafter Copyright Law].
85 Jianming Shen, The P.R.C. 's First Copyright Law Anayzed, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 529, 530 (1991).
86 Dumey, supra note 24, at 315.
87 See supra part 11A. The major rules and regulations of the world's most prominent
countries were incorporated into the Chinese Copyright Law both independently and
through Chinese membership in a number of the international trade organizations. See supra
part II.A.
88 Durney, supa note 24, at 315.
89 Id.; see Implementation Regulations to the Copyright Law, art. 1 (1991) (P.R.C.) re-
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of works are protected.90 In general, under Article 21, an author of a
work, whether an individual, legal entity, or an entity without legal per-
sonality, will enjoy copyright protection, which under the new law is
inheritable, for the author's lifetime plus fifty years. 9 1 Each author of a
joint work may claim copyrights independently for the sections that
author individually created, but the exercise of an individual copyright
claim cannot infringe upon the joint work's overall copyright.9 2
Currently, there are four provisions within the Copyright Law that
are exempt from any form of enforcement procedures. First, Article
16 protects "works-made-for hire" or works created in the course of
employment and ensures that authors of certain occupational works
may retain signatory rights as well as the economic rewards of publica-
tion.9 3 This Article extends to any author, whether a citizen, legal en-
tity, or entity without legal personality at the work's creation, and any
name that is mentioned in connection with a work will be deemed to
be an author of the work with full copyright protection.9 4 As for own-
ership of a Work produced in the course of employment, the Copyright
Law stipulates that when a work is made primarily from the material
and resources of the employing entity, it belongs to that entity and the
work unit will have priority for use; however, the right of authorship
remains with the person who has created the work. 95 The author has
the right to exploit his work within the scope of his professional activi-
ties, but for two years after completion of the work the author may not
authorize a third party to use the work in the same way as the entity
without the entity's consent.96 By handling the situation with a dual
analysis, the government stimulates both the author's creativity and his
professional innovation.
Second, the Law protects the moral rights of authors and creators.
The current Chinese Copyright Law seems to offer a level of "moral
protection" at least equal to that provided by the comparable intellec-
tual property laws of the world's major economic powers, including the
United States, because it covers almost all that is stipulated in the
printed in East Asian Executive Reports, Dec. 15, 1991, at 22, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, Easian File [hereinafter Implementation Regulations].
90 The nine categories protected under the new Law are as follows: (1) written literary
works; (2) orally delivered works; (3) musical, dramatic, quyi (or Chinese folklore/traditional
art forms), and choreographic works; (4) works of fine art and photographic works; (5) cine-
matographic, television, and videographic works; (6) drawings of engineering designs and
product designs; (7) maps, sketches, and other graphic works; (8) computer software (which
is formulated separately by the State Council, see infra part III); and (9) other works as pro-
vided for in laws and administrative regulations. Muwen, supra note 42, at 47 (citing Copy-
right Law, supra note 84, at art. 3).
9 1 1d. (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 21).
92 Id. at 48.
93 Yiping, supra note 45, at 265; see Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 16.
94 Muwen, supra note 42, at 48; see Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 11.




Berne Convention.9 7 In essence, laws that protect an author's "moral
rights" are concerned with the integrity of the author, and deal specifi-
cally with the protection against actions by parties which would directly
or indirectly injure the author's reputation or challenge his honor.98
Third, the Law protects economic rights. Article 10 outlines the
five basic personal and property rights which are protected: (1) the
right of publication, (2) the right of authorship, (3) the right of altera-
tion, (4) the right of integrity, and (5) the right of exploitation and
remuneration. 99 Article 10(5).specifically governs the economic rights
of authors, stating that an author has the "right to exploit his work by
reproduction, live performance, broadcasting, exhibition, distribution,
making cinematographic, television, or video production, adaptation,
translation, annotation, compilation and the like, and the right to au-
thorize others to exploit his works with aforementioned methods and
receive remuneration therefrom." 10 0 As discussed previously, Article
21 allows the economic rights granted under Article 10(5) to exist dur-
ing the author's lifetime, plus fifty years after death.10 1
Finally, the Law contains "fair" or "free" use provisions, which are
exceptions or limitations to the listed rights. Article 22 sets forth the
twelve fair uses of copyrighted works for which a user does not need to
obtain permission or pay any of the normally required remunera-
tions.10 2 These provisions apply equally to authors, publishers, per-
formers, producers of sound- and video recordings, and radio and
television stations.10 3
The "fair use" provisions are an attempt by the state to aid in the
cultural and educational development of the population and to en-
courage the rapid social and economic development of China.10 4 Nev-
ertheless, the provisions have been interpreted quite broadly, causing
concern among developed countries around the world, particularly
the United States. For instance, Article 22(7) approves the use of pub-
lished works by state organs when carrying out their official duties.
10 5
As a result of the way the Chinese society is organized, there are a
97 Yiping, supra note 45, at 265.
98 See generally id. at 264-66.
99 Muwen, supra note 42, at 47 (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 10).
100 Yiping, supra note 45, at 267 (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 10(5)).
101 Id. (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 21).
102 Id. at 268. Under Article 22, the twelve fair uses are: (1) personal enjoyment and
education; (2) appropriate quotations from a work to introduce or comment on another's
work; (3) reporting current events; (4) reprinting by news, radio, television stations, etc.; (5)
publication of'a speech delivered at a public gathering; (6) classroom teaching; (7) use by
state organs; (8) reproduction by libraries and archives; (9) free-of-charge live performance
of a published work; (10) copy and photographing of outdoor public exhibits; (11) transla-
tion of Chinese works into ethnic minority languages; and (12) translation into languages for
the visually impaired. Id. (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 22).
103 Muwen, supra note 42, at 49.
104 Id.
105 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 22(7).
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multitude of state-owned entities that are associated with "state or-
gans."106 Thus, the dominance of the state in China's economic orga-
nizations may erode effective copyright protection if the fair use
provisions are construed too broadly.
In addition, Article 22(6) deals with the translation of foreign lan-
guage works into Chinese when used for classroom teaching or scien-
tific research.' 0 7 While Article 29 provides that a translation may not
"unreasonably impair" the legitimate rights of copyright owners,108 this
may not be sufficient to protect foreign copyrighted works in all situa-
tions. The subject of foreign copyrighted works translated into Chi-
nese has long been a subject of interest, and in the early 1980s concern
for this issue grew as the Chinese demand for foreign materials in-
creased. 109 For example, in the 1980s, foreign professors were coming
to China to teach certain social science courses associated with the de-
velopment of a market economy, and China suffered a shortage of
textbooks which led to the widespread unauthorized translation and
publication of foreign university textbooks. 110 In 1990, experts esti-
mated that the piracy of American textbooks resulted in losses of $1
million annually."';,
Finally, material may be reprinted by newspapers or magazines, or
used in professional performances, audio recordings, radio or televi-
sion programs, without permission as long as the proper usage fees are
paid.112 Under Article 48, if a copyright owner does not want his work
to be performed or used to make a sound recording or a radio or
television program, he must make it known at the date of publication
or declare his intent in the Copyright Gazette published by the
NCAC;113 otherwise, a third party may exploit the work without
permission. 114
2. International Standards and Effects
Article 2 of the Copyright Law provides that any works of Chinese
citizens, legal entities, and entities without legal personalities are auto-
matically subject to copyright protection under the Law whether or not
the works are published. 1 5 However, at the time the Copyright Law
106 Yiping, supra note 45, at 279. Some critics, however, do not agree that the state organ
exemption will expand the scope of the fair use provision beyond reasonable means, and
instead assert that the provision merely reflects the traditional state supremacy concept that
has always dominated the Chinese political system. Id. at 280.
107 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 22(6).
108 Id. at art. 29.
109 Yiping, supra note 45, at 281.
110 Id.
111 China Promulgates New Copyright Law, INT'L EXECUTIVE REP., Oct. 15, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cunws File.
112 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at arts. 32, 35, 37, 40.
1 id. at art. 48.
114 Id.
115 Id- at art. 2.
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went into effect, it only protected works by foreign entities if they were
published in China first. Under Article 25, Section 3 of the Implemen-
tation Regulations to the Copyright Law, a book published outside
China will receive automatic copyright protection if it is also published
in China within thirty days of the initial foreign publication.1 16 As a
result, the United States disapproved of the original version of the
Copyright Law, because the protection provided to foreign works was
not as strong as that found in the Berne Convention. 117 In response,
the United States threatened trade sanctions and put China on the
Special 301 "priority watch list."" l8
At the last minute China folded under U.S. pressure and signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on January 17, 1992.119 The
MOU became a bilateral agreement on copyright when President Bush
proclaimed under 17 U.S.C. § 104(b) (5) that the MOU would give re-
ciprocal copyright protection to U.S. authors in China. t20 President
Bush made the announcement only after the Chinese government as-
sured him that the works of U.S. entities would receive the same auto-
matic protection that Chinese entities receive under the Copyright
Law, even when the works are first published in the United States. Pur-
suant to the MOU, China joined the Berne Convention on October 15,
1992, and the Universal Copyright Convention fifteen days later.' 21
China answered the question of automatic protection within its coun-
try by joining the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention.
Today, in China, a foreign work will automatically gain copyright
protection whether or not it is initially published in China. Also,
under the new regulations, a work will be protected regardless of the
country in which the work is first published if that country and China
either have an express agreement or are both parties to an interna-
tional copyright convention.1 22 In addition, in an effort to close the
gaps between the requirements of the Berne Convention and the Chi-
nese Copyright Law, the State Council of China issued the Interna-
116 Implementation Regulations, supra note 89, at art. 25(3).
117 Durney, supra note 24, at 315-16. At that point in time, China was not a member of
the Berne Convention. Id.
118 Special 301 is a device used by the U.S. Trade Representatives (USTR) to identify
foreign countries that do not have acceptable intellectual property rights protection. A
country that is placed on the "priority watch list" is one that has initially been warned, but has
failed to comply with the U.S. demands thereafter. By placing a country on the "priority
watch list" the United States hopes to encourage the nation to change its habits before any
major trade sanctions must be imposed. See infra part V.B. The Bush administration, which
created the "watch lists," was able to circumvent the mandatory retaliation provisions of Spe-
cial 301 to give trade negotiations more flexibility. Sadler, supra note 15, at 416-17.
119 Durney, supra note 24, at 316.
120 Id.
121 Yiping, supra note 45, at 264-65.
122 Id. This is in conformity with Article 3(4) of the Berne Convention.
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tional Treaties Implementation Rules (International Rules), which
provide in part:
1. Foreign works that are covered by the Berne Convention or a bi-
lateral treaty are protected, whether published or unpublished.
2. Foreign works of applied art are protected for twenty-five years
from the date on which they are made.
3. Foreign computer programs are protected as literary works for a
term of fifty years from the end of the year of the first publication. No
registration of foreign computer programs is required before institut-
ing a lawsuit.
4. Translating a foreign work originally created in Chinese to the
language of a minority national requires prior permission of the copy-
right owner. This translation under the 1991 Copyright Law is a fair
use.
5. Rights given by the 1991 Copyright Law to radio and television
stations to broadcast sound recordings, and rights given to periodicals
to reprint works from other periodicals, exclude foreign works.
6. The P.R.C. [People's Republic of China] must give foreign
copyright owners the exclusive right to "import" their copyrighted
works. 123I
Inconsistencies between the Berne Convention and the Copyright Law
are resolved under Article 142 of China General Principles of Civil
Law.124 Finally, under Article 17 of the International Rules, there can
be no retroactive liability for infringement before the Copyright Law
or the Implementing Regulations were enacted.1 25
3. Enforcement and Remedies
Unlike other copyright laws, the Copyright Law of China spells
out the acts that are infringing. Specifically, there are five actions that
are considered to be copyright infringements: (1) publishing a work
without the consent of the copyright owner; (2) publishing a work of
joint authorship as a work created solely by oneself, without the con-
sent of the other co-authors; (3) having one's name mentioned in con-
nection with a work created by another; (4) distorting or mutilating a
work created by another; and (5) exploiting a work without the con-
sent of the copyright owner as prescribed by regulations.12 6 Under the
law, violators are subject to civil liability which requires cessation of the
infringing act, elimination of the effects of the act, and a public apol-
123 Durney, supra note 24, at 318 (citing Zheng Chengsi, The Chinese Copyright System and
Three Relevant Copyright Conventions, CoPRGmHT WoRLD, Dec. 1992-Jan. 1993, at 33, 34-35). See
China: Regulations .for Implementing the Berne Convention, CoPYGrr WoRLD, Nov. 1992, at 7
(giving the text of the International Rules). The International Rules refer only to the Berne
Convention and bilateral agreements to which China is a party. Id. The Chinese Copyright
Law already meets the requirements of the Universal Copyright Convention and the Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Phonograms. Id.
124 Durney, supra note 24, at 318 (citing Zheng, supra note 123, at 35).
125 Id. at 318-19 (citing Yang Xiaoguang, Protection of Intellectual Property in the People's
Republic of China, 7 WIPR 78, 80-81 (1993)).
126 Muwen, supra note 42, at 50 (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art.45).
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ogy and/or compensation for damages. 127 However, if the violations
are deemed to be more egregious in nature, then the remedies include
administrative penalties such as confiscation of any unlawful income
from the infringing act and imposition of a fine.12 8
As China continues to grow in both size and economic sophistica-
tion, the system of copyright protection will require more than one
method in which to remedy violations. Article 48 of the Copyright Law
outlines that individuals and entities can pursue copyright infringers in
three ways: mediation, administrative proceedings, and civil litiga-
tion.' 29 Of these three methods, mediation has traditionally been the
most common proceeding in copyright cases,130 but as China contin-
ues to move towards a market economy there may be a surge in arbitra-
tion and litigation.131 In 1979, the current civil law system was
reestablished as a mix of socialist ideology, ancient practices, tradi-
tional values, and modern legal principles after years of latency; as a
result, the Chinese Civil Procedure Law did not become effective until
April 9, 1991.132 Given the short period of time that the Copyright
Law and the civil law court system have been active, any civil litigation
by foreign companies is likely to be decided by inexperienced judges
unsure of the law and the direction in which it is developing. 133 Be-
cause the Chinese courts have little experience deciding these cases,
they undoubtedly will have a difficult time determining the amount of
damages to be awarded even if infringement is found.
134
There are many problems associated with bringing a case to trial
in China's judicial system. The first is collecting the evidence. The
party whose rights are being violated often must resort to raiding the
infringing parties' premises and seizing the illegal material in order to
have concrete proof of piracy to.present as evidence.' 3 5 Next, a for-
127 Jd.
128 Id. Such aggravating violations are as follows: (1) plagiarizing a work created by
another; (2) reproducing and distributing a work for commercial purposes without the con-
sent of the copyright owner; (3) publishing a book where the exclusive right of publication
belongs to another; (4) infringing on the legitimate rights, as prescribed by the Law, of pub-
lishers, performers, producers of sound recordings or video recordings, and broadcasters;
and (5) producing or selling a work of fine art upon which the signature of the artist is
counterfeited. Id. (citing Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 46).
129 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 48. See also Durney, supra note 24, at 323;
Muwen, supra note 42, at 50.
130 Durney, supra note 24, at 323.
131 Id. (citing Michael D. Pendleton & Zheng Chengsi, The Chinese Copyright Law-Oppor-
tunities for Foreign Investors and for China, COPYMGHT WORLD, July-Aug. 1991, at 41, 42).
132 Id.
13s Id.
134 Id. (citing Morag Macdonald, Intellectual Property in China-Protection or Exploitation?,
COPYRIGHT WORLD, Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 32, 32-34).
135 Susan Orenstein, More Than Mickey Mouse Enforcement, RECORDER, July 7, 1994, at 1,
available in Lexis, News Library, Curnws File. For example, Walt Disney hired a Chinese
investigative firm to gather evidence against pirates it was planning to sue, in a Chinese court.
Id. But the firm did not complete the job, so Disney had to use its own employees to raid
stores on the streets of Beijing to confiscate incriminating evidence. Id.
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eign firm must use local Chinese Deacons and local lawyers, because
foreign lawyers are not allowed to practice before the Chinese
courts.13 6 This can be quite frustrating since local Chinese lawyers are
often under-trained in intellectual property rights laws because these
laws are new and technical in nature.13 7
Su Chi, Chief of the Copyright Court, has said that the Chinese
court will treat both foreign and Chinese parties on the basis of fair
judgment, and that all judgments will be made without subjectivity and
according to strict interpretation of China's civil prosecution and copy-
right laws. 138 At this point, in theory, litigants have equal chances to
have their case heard without the threat of illegal interference.13 9 Yet,
despite these procedures, both foreign and domestic litigants fre-
quently have been dissatisfied with the legal system and the level of
fines assessed in intellectual property cases.140
With the massive changes in intellectual property rights protec-
tion, China has set up a specialized intellectual property tribunal, the
Intellectual Property Rights Chamber, affiliated with the Beijing Inter-
mediate People's Court. Since 1993, the Chamber has adjudicated
more than seventy cases, the majority of which have been software
cases, and settled another forty. 141 Moreover, in early July 1994, the
National People's Congress established copyright courts in Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangdong, Hainan, and Fujian. 142 In September 1994,
China also instituted its first "national intellectual property rights
watchdog," a nongovernmental center in Beijing, known as the United
Intellectual Property Protection Center, whose function is to protect
anyone "whose trademark, brand name, insignia, patent, copyright,
know-how or other intellectual property is nationally or internationally
Also, in June 1994, the Business Software Alliance and the Beijing International Property
Rights Chamber had tojointly raid five companies in order to seize illegally pirated goods for
evidence in a copyright infringement suit brought by three major U.S. software companies.
Software Firms Sue Chinese Over 'Pirates, 'LEGAL INTELLiGENcER, July 28, 1994, at 11, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
136 Orenstein, supra note 135, at 1.
137 Id. Furthermore U.S. lawyers say some of the biggest problems with pursuing a law-
suit in China's court system is the history of the legal system: (1) there is a lack of legal
training amongjudges, (2) state officials still interfere in lawsuits, and (3) judges are paid low
salaries which makes them susceptible to bribes. Uli Schmetzer, China Taking the Wind out of
Copyright Pirates' Sales, CHi. TPiB., Aug. 10, 1994, at 1.
138 Beijing Copyright Court Accepts 40 Overseas Cases, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 29, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, News File.
139 Id.
140 Donna KH. Walters, Chinese Court For First Time Upholds U.S. Firm's Piracy: Size of Pen-
alty in Disney Case Is Seen as Test of its Commitment to Crack Down on Intellectual Property Theft and
Avoid Sanctions, LA. TiMs, Aug. 5, 1994, at Dl.
141 China Court to Hear Three U.S. Copyright Suits, REUTER LIMnED, July 27, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, News File.




recognized. 1 43 The center's primary function is to monitor the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights nationally and regionally. 144
It also aids in the legal adjudication of infringement cases for both
domestic and foreign clients by conducting investigations, gathering
evidence, and filing lawsuits in more than twenty-six provinces, munici-
palities, and autonomous regions within China.145
The private sector of China is getting involved in the fight against
intellectual property rights infringement as well. For example, in July
1993, a group of Hong Kong professionals joined in a Beijing-sup-
ported joint venture consulting group, entitled Intellectual Property
Protection Services, to provide businessmen with guidance on how to
protect their intellectual property rights.146 The group has assisted
such well-known clients as Walt Disney and Burroughs Wellcome. 147
When a foreign party decides to pursue administrative arbitration,
the NCAC 148 is responsible for investigating and deciding the degree
of copyright infringement, but it is often uncertain exactly how these
administrative proceedings will operate. 149 Generally, in an adminis-
trative proceeding, remedies for infringement violations include a
public apology, compensation, and in some cases confiscation of the
unlawful income, injunctions, public warnings, jail time, and fines. 15 0
A party dissatisfied with the administrative penalty assessed in arbitra-
tion has three months to appeal the written decision. 15 1 In early July
1994, the National People's Congress increased the maximum prison
term for copyright violations from five to seven years plus fines, and
new laws state that trademark violators may be subject to the death
penalty in certain situations.1 52
IlL. Computer Software
A. Introduction
As technology has advanced, the concern of U.S. software compa-
143 China Starts Center as Patent Watchdog, ASIAN WALL ST.J., Sept. 23, 1994, at 4, available
in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
144 Id.
145 Id. The center plans to expand to four more areas by the end of 1994 and to estab-
lish offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou. Id.
146 Carrie Lee, HK Brightest Help Protect Copyright, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, May 6, 1994, at
5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The company is headed by the China Inter-
national Economic and Legal Consultant's Corporation Director, Zhou Daimou, and is
staffed by retired senior officers from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Public Secur-
ity. Id.
147 Id.
148 See supra part II.B.3.
149 Durney, supra note 24, at 325.
150 Enforcement, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA HAND, Jan. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File; see infra note 152 and accompanying text; see also Copy-
right Law, supra note 84, at art. 46.
151 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 50.
152 China's Piracy Woes Tarnish Image, UPI,July 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
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nies has called attention to the inefficiencies of China's current laws
governing the protection of software copyrights. The need to consider
the protection of computer software is relatively new. It has come
about only with the development of low-cost personal and microcom-
puters, and with the creation of application programs not linked to a
given piece of hardware but programmed as commodities them-
selves) 53 After these developments, it did not take long for a need for
legal protection to arise. Software piracy in China reached epidemic
proportions in the 1980s. In 1988 alone, it is estimated that U.S. busi-
nesses lost upwards of $300 million as a result of computer software
piracy in China.1 54 Since that time, unauthorized software duplication
has cost American companies $400 million annually in lost sales.15 5 In
1994, the U.S. software industry lost $351 million, and the rate of
software piracy in China exceeded ninety-eight percent. 156 As a result
of the reported levels of software piracy, the USTR placed China on
the Special 301 "priority watch list" for the third time in April 1991.157
Indecisiveness among Chinese officials as to whether computer
software protection should be handled through patent or copyright
laws delayed any progress on creation of the law. Copyright laws were
eventually deemed to be the more appropriate mechanism, because
essentially a computer program is a form of writing, "a fixation of
words, phrases, numbers or other indicia in various media" which can
be followed by a human being.158 Recognizing this idea, the Chinese
government attempted to remedy extensive pirating by providing
153 JANET HAMILTON, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
84TH ANNUAL MEETING 256, 262 (1990).
154 Jia Zhao, Computer Software Protection: New Regulations Go Into Effect, E. ASIAN EXECU-
Trv REP., Oct. 15, 1991, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
155 Yiping, supra note 45, at 282 (citing David Holley, U.S. Vows Tariffs if China Fails to
Curb Piracy ofSoftware, LA. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, at D1).
156 Jean-Louis Santini, U.S.-China Pact Key Trade Victoiy for Washington, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Feb. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
157 Yiping, supra note 45, at 260. "Special 301" is a part of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act that is intended to protect the intellectual property rights of U.S. manu-
facturers in foreign countries with whom the United States has trade agreements. Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242 (a)(1), 2411.
Under the "Special 301" provision, . . . failure to provide adequate and
effective protection for [American] intellectual property rights constitutes an
unreasonable trade practice. The [A]ct requires the [United States Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR)] to identify countries engaging in such practices or deny-
ing fair and equitable market access to [American] companies that rely on
intellectual property protection. Countries so identified are designated 'prior-
ity countries.'
Id. at n.3.
China was placed on the "priority watch list" in both 1989 and 1990 by the USTR for
inadequate intellectual property protection and for its lack of a copyright law. See infra part
III.B.
158 HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 262. Copyright law provides a better balance of propri-
etary and user interests. Id. It is uniform, complete and not as sweeping a protection system
as the current patent law. Id.
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software protection under existing copyright provisions.1 59 Eventually,
the Chinese government created a separate set of regulations to gov-
ern the copyright protection of computer software as a supplement to
the Copyright Law of 1991. Article 53 of the Copyright Law now
clearly states that "[r]egulations for the protection of computer
software shall be formulated separately by the State Council." 160
B. The Regulations For the Protection of Computer Software
1. In General
On June 4, 1991, the State Council introduced the Regulations for
the Protection of Computer Software (Software Regulations), and they
were put into effect on October 1, 1991.161 Less than one year later,
on April 6, 1992, the Measures for the Registration of Copyright in
Computer Software (Registration Measures) were signed by the head
of the Ministry of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry, the or-
ganization responsible for the interpretation and revision of the Regis-
tration Measures.' 62 Shortly thereafter, the Software Assessment and
Registration Center (Software Center) was established by the Chinese
government in order to manage the registration of computer software
and to publish a software newsletter.1 63 The Software Center was
formed to provide new registrants with certificates and announce new
applications upon registration, so that the Chinese population would
be notified and educated about new copyright holders and their
rights. 6
2. Definitions
The protection of software owes its origin to Article 3 of the Copy-
right Law that expressly protects "works of literature, art .... engineer-
ing and technology... which are expressed in the following forms,....
[including] Computer Software." 165 Yet, the specific laws governing
the protection of software were left under the term, "computer
software" and the 1991 Computer Software Regulations.1 6 6 Under Ar-
ticle 3(1) of the Software Regulations, computer programs are defined
as a series of coded instructions, or a series of sentences which can be
converted into coded instructions, which can be executed on com-
159 Henry H. Liu, Legislative Update-Legal Aspects of Software Protection in China: The Com-
puter Software Protection Regulations, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TEcH. L.J. 469, 470
(1993).
160 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 53.
161 Durney, supra note 24, at 320.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Xiao-Lin, supra note 12, at 1127.
165 Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 3.
166 Liu, supra note 159, at 470. The Chinese government abandoned the idea of han-
dling the protection of computer software under the Copyright Law after discovering that
the protection would be less effective and more impractical. Id.
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puters or other information-processing equipment. 167 This definition
also encompasses "documentation," which consists of the flow charts
and materials compiled and written in natural language or formal lan-
guage that are used to document the content, design and function of
computer software or to record a computer program.1 68 Like Article 3
of the Copyright Law, Article 3 of the Software Regulations states that
in order to receive protection, software must be developed indepen-
dently and must be fixed in a tangible medium or a hard copy. 169 The
purpose of Chinese protection for software development, like the
Copyright Law, is to advance the creativity and originality of its
citizens.1 70
In addition, the Software Regulations recognize citizens, foreign-
ers, and both non-legal and legal entities, 171 which are each afforded
equal protection of their software.1 72 However, just like the Copyright
Law, the Software Regulations differentiate between Chinese entities
and foreigners on certain measures. For example, Article 6 of the
Software Regulations states that Chinese citizens who develop software
shall enjoy copyright protection "regardless of whether or where the
said software has been made public."1 73 Yet, unlike the Chinese citi-
zens, foreigners must "make their software public" or publish their
software before being eligible for copyright protection in China.1
74
In the Registration Procedures, the rules specify that to "make
public" is to distribute software through retail sales markets or to dis-
play software publicly with the express intent to circulate more cop-
ies. 175 Software developed by a foreigner and first made public outside
China will be afforded protection "in accordance with agreements con-
cluded between his country and China or with international conven-
tions acceded to by his country and China."176 In other words,just like
the Copyright Law, the Software Regulations indicate that foreigners
who initially release computer software within China will be protected
automatically by the laws, and those who release their works outside of
China will be governed by the bilateral or multilateral international
treaties to which both China and the foreigner's country are parties.
1 77
The treatment of the joint development of software by the
167 The Regulations on Computer Software Protection, at art. 3(1) (1991) (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Software Regulations].
168 Id. at art. 3(2).
169 Id. at art. 5.
170 Id.
171 These entities carry out development work, provide working facilities for software
development, and assume responsibility for the software. Id. at arts. 3(3)-(4), 6.
173Id.
173 Id. at art. 6.174 Md at art. 9(1).
175 Liu, supra note 159, at 477 (citing Measures for Computer Software Copyright Registration,
2 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 1 11-706(3) (1992)).




Software Regulations is similar to that found in the Copyright Law.17 s
Software developed by two or more entities in cooperation is jointly
owned by the parties.179 The developers may separately enjoy the
copyright to the portion they developed if the software may be parti-
tioned and used, but if the software is not divisible the parties may only
use the copyright cooperatively.180 Protection of software developed
during the course of employment is addressed in two ways. If the
software is developed specifically for the company as a part of a corpo-
rate strategy, the software copyright belongs to the corporate entity.181
However, if the software is neither developed by a citizen in direct rela-
tion to job activities or developed using the employer's resources and
facilities, then the copyright belongs to the citizen.'
82
3. Rights and Regulations
Article 4 broadly outlines that software copyright privileges extend
to an owner of a piece of software and to his assignee of the "various
rights under the software copyright prescribed by these regula-
tions."183 Generally, under Article 9 these privileges or "rights" which
are afforded to a legitimate copyright owner under Article 4 fall into
two categories, personal rights and property rights. The first two provi-
sions are the personal rights of publication and authorship. 184 The du-
ration of these rights is unlimited because they refer to the protection
of the personal reputation and honor of the developer himself.
185 Ar-
ticle 9, Sections (3) through (5), which define "property rights," limit
the duration of such rights because they protect the actual creation.
18 6
A copyright holder may license the copyright through a renewable
contract for a period of ten years or less.18 7 The copyright owner and
any assignees are able to charge royalty fees for such exploitations.
18 8
178 Compare id. at art. 11 with Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 13.
179 Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 11.
180 Id. If unanimity cannot be reached by the developing parties, none of the parties
may prevent the other party or parties from exercising the rights other than the right of
assignment. Id. In that event, the proceeds may be reasonably distributed among the legiti-
mate copyright holders or partners. Id.
181 Id. at art. 14.
182 Id. However, under Article 13, software developed in fulfillment of a work assign-
ment by a higher entity or government department under a contract or letter work assign-
ment will be the property of the entity which accepts the assignment. Id. at art. 13.
183 Id. at art. 4.
184 Article 9(1)-(2) reads as follows: (1) the right to decide whether to publish the
software; and (2) the right to identify himself or herself and affix his or her name. Id. at art.
9(1)-(2).
185 Liu, supra note 159, at 478.
186 Article 9 Sections (3)-(5) read as follows: (3) the right to use the software by dupli-
cating, demonstrating, publishing, altering, translating, or annotating the software on condi-
tion that such does not harm the public interest; (4) the right to authorize use of software by
others and receive remuneration therefor, (5) the right to assign use of the software.
Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 9(3)-(5).
187 I. at art. 18.
188 Md
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These signed licensing agreements do not change the ownership of
the copyright, and under the laws of China the rights to exclusivity
must be clearly stipulated within the contract.189 Finally, under Article
28, when a Chinese copyright owner licenses the rights of protected
software to a foreigner outside of China, the original copyright owner
must report the agreement to two parties, the Software Registration
Center and the State Council.' 90
Under the Software Regulations there are limitations on the copy-
right protection afforded to software. While the law expressly prohib-
its illegal sales or duplication of software, a party may duplicate the
work if it is in small amounts and, under the "fair use" provisions, such
duplication does not require the permission of the software copyright
holder.1 91 Any party that legally holds computer software programs
may load the software, make backup copies for "archival purposes,"
and alter the programs in order to improve their capabilities or adapt
them to other computer applications. 192 Like the Copyright Law, the
Software Regulations list several "fair" or "free" uses that exempt a
party from liability for infringing activity.193 For example, under Arti-
cle 22, software may be copied if it is needed to implement rules or
technical standards of the state or where there are only a limited
number of ways the material may be presented. 194 Finally, if the
software is of "great significance" to national or public interests, to the
State Council, or to the People's Government, it may be used for a
given exploitation fee. 195 Nevertheless, in all cases, all copies made in
the course of the exempted infringing activity must be stored properly
and returned to the copyright owner directly after use. 196
These issues raise concern among many outside observers, be-
cause the "fair" uses listed are broad and actually leave the door open
for infringing activity by non-state-owned, but state-affiliated, organiza-
tions. For example, one of China's largest counterfeiters, the Tianjin
New Star Electronics Co., which sold more than 300 pirated video
games in 1993, is operated by the government even though it is not
formally a state-owned organization.197 The company's president is
the director of a department in the Ministry of Electronics and Ma-
chinery, and the ministry receives twenty percent of New Star's prof-
189 Id.
190 Id. at art. 28.
191 Id. at art. 22. This provision includes noncommercial activities such as classroom
teaching, scientific research, and official state duties. Id.
192 Id. at art. 21.
193 See id. at art. 22. Cf Copyright Law, supra note 84, at art. 22.
194 Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 22.
195 Id. at arts. 13, 22.
196 Id. at art. 22. Also, instead of returning the copies, a party may destroy them after use
so they are not used for other purposes or supplied to others. Id.
197 Howard Lincoln, Huge China Market a Mirage, AsiAN WALL ST.J., Mar. 24, 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, Allnews Database.
[VOL. 20
CHINESE COPYRIGHT LAW
its. 198 Thus, the Chinese government is able to find its way around the
Software Regulations, and the active presence of the government in
the practice of piracy makes it unlikely that these regulations will be
enforced properly.199 Merchants selling pirated goods admit that the
state, up to this time, has played both sides of the coin by selling both
legitimate and pirated goods on the same street corner.200
Finally, other concerns center around the ambiguity of the lan-
guage found within the regulations themselves. For instance, the law
indicates that copyright protection is extended to "legitimate" holders
of software.20 1 Yet the term "legitimate" can be interpreted in an ad
hoc way by the Chinese courts, depending on the facts of the specific
situation. 20 2 Also, in their current form, the Software Regulations
mandate that a copyright owner's use of the software "not harm public
interest."203 Experts fear that this phrase can be too easily manipu-
lated and that the definition of "harm" is too subjective to provide a
uniform standard. 20 4
4. Term of Copyright Protection
In the case of computer software, registration is a prerequisite
only for the pursuit of an administrative settlement or the institution of
a legal proceeding.20 5 In other words, a software developer does not
have to register the computer program to be protected, but if the pro-
gram is ever violated and the author wishes to recover via the legal
system, the program must have been registered. Furthermore, auto-
matic protection only lasts twenty-five years, ending on the 31st day of
December of the twenty-fifth year after the software is first pub-
lished, 206 and under Article 15 of the Software Regulations an applica-
tion must be obtained by the Software Registration Center after twenty-
five years to extend protection an additional twenty-five years. 20 7 This
requirement does not comply with the fifty-year term of protection
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Elaine Kurtenbach, A Problem With Pirates: China, US on Brink of Trade War Over Illegal
Copies of Cos, Videos, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 5, 1995, at D1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
201 Moga, supra note 29, at 322.
202 Id.
203 ld.
204 Id. The troublesome issue about this phrase is that there is no uniform standard to
define what constitutes harm, and logic may play only a limited role. Id. For example, two
individuals in 1990 were executed in the Fujian Province because they had distributed cards
with pictures of nude women. Id.
205 Zhao, supra note 154. By registering software, the owner is able to prove that the
software is valid and that he has the authority to pursue legal recourse for any copyright
violations. Id. If the software is registered and subsequently assigned, the new owner must
re-register within three months to be afforded any protection. Id.
206 Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 15.
207 Id.
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spelled out in the Berne Convention.208 Nonetheless, the United
States is unaffected by the discrepancy because the Berne Convention
prevails over any inconsistencies in domestic laws, and the twenty-five
year limit does not apply to computer programs authored by foreign
Berne member countries.20 9 After expiration of the copyright, the
.property rights" previously mentioned terminate automatically and
the "personal rights" continue forever.210
5. Infringement
Software protection is similar to traditional copyright protection
in that the governing laws are designed to protect the reasonable
rights and interests of the authors and to provide incentives for contin-
ued creativity and publication.211 As a result, many of the provisions
set forth in the Software Regulations are similar to those in the Copy-
right Law of 1991. According to the Software Regulations, any infring-
ing party must make a public apology and compensate the owner for
any damages incurred; also, the State administrative authorities may
impose administrative sanctions, fine the parties, and confiscate the
income derived from the infringing activity.212 Article 32 clearly spells
out eight actions by individuals or entities which are considered to be
infringing.21 3 Furthermore, to be considered infringing, a piece of
software must be more than just similar to an existing piece of software
protected by a copyright.214 Also, where one party has no reasonable
basis for knowing that the software in its possession is infringing, the
liability is borne by the supplier who has distributed the infringing
software knowing the program was in violation of the copyright laws.
215
In this case, the legitimate copyright holder may demand compensa-
tion from the supplier for the losses suffered, and if the holder's rights
are egregiously affected he may rightfully demand that the other party
208 See supra note 29.
209 Durney, supra note 24, at 321 (citing Michael D. Pendleton, Chinese-Intellectual Prop-
erty: Some Global Implications for Legal Culture and National Sovereignty, 4 EIPR 119, 120 (1993)).
Article 7 of the International Rules provides: "Foreign computer programs shall be pro-
tected as literary works, being subject to no registration and enjoying a term of protection of
fifty years commencing from the end of the year of first publication." Id.
210 Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 20.
211 Liu, supra note 159, at 472.
212 Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 30.
213 These eight provisions are as follows: (1) publishing software without consent; (2)
publishing someone else's software as your own; (3) publishing software developed in coop-
eration with others as your own without consent of the developers; (4) indicating your own
name on software developed by others or obliterating the name on software developed by
others; (5) altering, translating, or annotating software without consent; (6) copying software
in whole or part without consent; (7) distributing or disclosing software to the public without
consent; and (8) conducting business concerning licensing or transfer of the software to a
third party without -consent, and knowingly supplying an infringing piece of software to
others. Id. at art. 32.
214 Id. at art. 31.
* 215 Id. at art. 32.
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destroy its version of the infringing software. 16
A software infringement dispute may be resolved either through
mediation or through binding arbitration in either the intellectual
property arm of the People's Court or the software copyright arbitra-
tion organ of the state.217 Parties unsatisfied after arbitration proceed-
ings may bring their case to court if one of three circumstances exists:
(1) one party fails to execute the award; (2) the People's Court finds
the arbitral award illegal; or (3) the parties do not have an arbitration
clause in the contract and there is no written agreement.2 18 Finally, a
party may be subject to civil liability under the General Principles of
the Civil Law if that party fails to carry out its contract or fails to per-
form the duties of a contract governing intellectual property rights
transfer in conformity with the stipulated conditions. 219
While China continues to make inroads on curbing software in-
fringement, the current system still has holes and problems for the
Chinese government to iron out. For example, the organization re-
sponsible for border controls, the Administrative Authority for
Software Copyright, has no appreciable power to enforce the software
laws.22 0 Likewise, the Chinese government has yet to issue jurisdic-
tional power to groups like the National Copyright Administration
(NCAC), greatly limiting such organizations' enforcement ability.22 1
As the market in China and the needs of the Chinese people con-
tinue to expand, demand for commercial software will grow as well. As
long as the Chinese are behind other western countries in the ability to
meet this demand with quality products, the United States will con-
tinue to be a major presence in China's software market. In fact, U.S.
companies are supplying most of the commercial software sold in
China, and they have spent millions on the, technology required to
provide these goods.222 The reality of this very valuable investment is
precisely why the United States is leading the fight to establish stronger
copyright enforcement in China.
216 Id. at art. 31.
217 Liu, supra note 159, at 484.
218 Software Regulations, supra note 167, at art. 35.
219 Id&
220 Lincoln, supra note 197.
221 Id. The NCAC has only superficial enforcement responsibilities, because the Chinese
government is still contemplating giving jurisdiction over software matters to the Ministry of
Electronics, ironically the same group that controls one of China's largest counterfeiters. Id.
222 For example, Nintendo of America spends on average two years and one-million dol-
lars in investment capital to produce just one video game. Id. The imagination and ingenu-
ity is what makes these technological creations so unique and valuable; only within the past
few years, Nintendo of America has lost $1.2 billion to the over 20 million units illegally
counterfeited by Chinese pirates. Id.
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IV. Recent Lawsuits and Other Legal Developments
A. The Walt Disney Case
In recent history, U.S. companies have begun to seek redress for
their intellectual property grievances in the Chinese court system.
Thus far, the vast majority of such efforts have been unsuccessful. Yet
American business giants such as Walt Disney, Microsoft, and Lotus
have stepped up efforts to find a legal remedy for copyright violations
in the People's Republic of China.223
On August 3, 1994, the Beijing Intermediate Court ruled in favor
of Walt Disney Co. against a prominent Beijing children's book pub-
lisher, in the first copyright infringement case brought by an American
company in China.224 The ruling is expected to have major economic
ramifications, as Hollywood studios are encouraged to resume supply-
ing films, television, and video products to China.225 In addition,
many observers agree that this ruling may be only the tip of the eco-
nomic iceberg, because many other U.S. companies interested in en-
tering the lucrative Chinese markets see this ruling as a promising sign
that China is dedicated to protecting intellectual property rights.226
The Disney suit, only one of twenty civil cases filed in two years to re-
ceive a judgment, also may have touched off what could be the key to
curbing piracy in China-getting the Chinese people to realize that
they are victims of piracy as well.
The precedent-setting Walt Disney case is the first publication
copyright lawsuit filed by a U.S. company in the special intellectual
property court in Beijing, and the case is being hailed as the "first tan-
gible sign that the Chinese authorities are getting serious about crack-
ing down on rampant piracy."22 7 The Beijing People's Intermediate
Court found that the Beijing Publishing Press/Beijing Children's Pub-
lishing Press and its distributor, New China Book Store Distribution
Center, illegally published and distributed a range of children's books
based on Disney animated films.2 28 According to the state-run paper,
the Guangming Daily, the defendants argued that they had acted legally
under a license obtained from a company in Hong Kong. 2 9 The Bei-
jing Court found that the 300,000 books published and distributed by
the companies were identical to a series produced earlier by another
223 Amy Borrus, Peter Engardio, and Richard Brandt, Will China Scuttle Its Pirates?, BUST-
NESSWEEK, Aug. 15, 1994, at 40.
224 Chinese Court Backs Disney Copyrigh4 DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 5, 1994, at 5.
225 Id.
226 Bronwen Maddox, Chinese Pirates Fail to Take Mickey out of Disney, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1994, at 14.
227 Chinese Court Backs Disney Copyright, supra note 224, at 5.
228 Id. The books contained such well-known Disney characters as Mickey Mouse, Cin-
derella, Peter Pan, and Snow White. Id.
229 Maddox, sura note 226, at 14.
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Chinese company under a Disney license that had expired in 1990.230
The ruling by the newly formed intellectual property division of the
Beijing People's Intermediate Court determined the liability portion
of the trial, but the penalty phase has yet to follow. 231 Walt Disney has
not disclosed the damages it is seeking, but Chuck Champlin, Commu-
nications Director for Disney Consumer Products, indicated that Dis-
ney has asked the court to be compensated for lost revenues. 232 More
specifically, Claire Robinson, Vice-President and Counsel who heads
Disney's anti-piracy efforts out of Burbank, California, explained that
Disney would be seeking penalties equal to profits made by the pirates
which would be less than $300,000.233 Sources for Business Asia re-
ported that damages being sought totalled approximately $77,000.234
Under current Chinese Copyright Law, a party who proves infringe-
ment of its copyright is entitled to recovery of the income earned from
the infringing activity when aggravating circumstances, like those pres-
ent in the Disney case, exist.2 35
Prior to the ruling, Disney was selling a limited range of merchan-
dise in approximately seventy Chinese department stores via a Hong
Kong-based licensee, Vigor International. 236 Now, however, Disney
has severely limited the distribution of its character goods because of
the extent of piracy of Disney images within the country.2 37 Disney has
been earning more than $100 million a year in China on legitimately
marketed goods, but illegitimate sales are estimated to cost the com-
pany tens of millions of dollars annually.238 In the 1980s, Disney was
forced to cancel a successful half-hour Disney television show, because
the exposure only served to popularize the characters and to further
enrich the pirates. 239
Experts say that the size of the penalty imposed in the Disney case
230 Walters, supra note 140, at D1.
231 id.
232 Maddox, supra note 226, at 14.
233 Walters, supra note 140, at DI.
234 Developments in China, Bus. AslA, Aug. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Curnws File.
235 Muwen, supra note 42, at 50. Such aggravating circumstances include the
"reproduct[ion] and distributi[on of] a work for commercial purposes without the consent
of the copyright owner" and the "publication of a book where the exclusive right of publica-
tion belongs to another." Id. Both of these aggravating circumstances existed in the Disney
case.
236 Chinese Court Backs Disney Copyright, supra note 224. Disney had also hoped to resume
supplying Disney products to Chinese television before the end of the year, but only plans to
follow through if Beijing makes a concerted effort to crackdown on piracy. Id.
237 Maddox, supra note 226, at 14.
238 Susan Orenstein, Disney Duels with Chinese "Pirates" over Mickey: Case goes to New Beijing
Court, LEGAL TIMES, July 25, 1994, at 2; see also Kevin Drawbaugh, US. Businesses Hopeful Cau-
tious on China Trade Issue, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Feb. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
239 Drawbaugh, supra note 238. A similar cancellation occured in 1992 for the same
reasons. Disney Wins Copyright Suit Against Chinese Companies, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5,
1994, at B1.
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will be a major test of China's commitment to its crackdown on intel-
lectual property rights infringement because past penalties imposed by
Chinese courts against intellectual property rights violators have been
inadequate.2 40 For example, in an earlier trademark infringement
case won by Disney, the infringing Chinese publisher was fined only
$91, while Disney spent more than $15,000 in legal costs alone.2 41
When Disney tried to appeal, government officials discouraged them,
saying that it would embarrass the trademark agency and would take
too long.2 42
According to Claire Robinson, the Disney copyright case was
brought as a "test case" to see how serious China is about putting
"more teeth" in its intellectual property laws.2 43 "Ve are going
through this to set a precedent," remarked Robinson, "[i]f we lose, it
will be grounds for further complaining. If we win, it will be precedent
for further success."244 Disney, historically a staunch defender of its
intellectual property rights, is concerned with the actions by the Chi-
nese government because of the potential damage to company fi-
nances and to the company's reputation for quality.2 45
Skeptics have reaffirmed their predictions that the impact of the
Disney case will not be of landmark proportions as once hoped, be-
cause as of April, 1995, no penalty had been assessed yet.2 46 The origi-
nal ruling was handed down over eight months ago, in early August.
Chuck Champlin, Communications Director for Disney Consumer
Products, explained in frustration that Disney has been "waiting for
the penalty phase of [the] case, but it's been put off and put off."2 4 7 In
his estimation, the delay in assessing money damages against the in-
fringing parties is a "microcosm of this whole issue. They [the Chinese
government] seem to be willing to acknowledge that piracy is a prob-
lem, but are reluctant to do anything about it."248 A penalty is not
expected to be handed down until after the United States and China
work out the terms of the recently signed agreement concerning en-
forcement of intellectual property violations. 249
In the meantime, Disney is taking steps of its own to crack down
on piracy and the illegal counterfeit of Disney products. For example,
in mid-December Walt Disney opened a regional office of its Televi-
sion and Telecommunications Unit in Hong Kong to monitor the Asia
240 Waiters, supra note 140, at Dl.




245 Disney Wins Copyright Suit Against Chinese Companies, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug.5, 1994,
at B1.
246 Drawbaugh, supra note 238.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 See infra part V.B.
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Pacific Region.2 50 Sources from Disney explained that the new office
will manage all of its television interests, including television sales, mar-
keting, and production, in the Asia Pacific area.251 By opening this
office, Disney hopes to take advantage of investment opportunities, to
capitalize on the, growth opportunities in television business, and to
crack down on counterfeiting.252 Nevertheless, until the Chinese gov-
ernment takes substantial steps toward the enforcement of copyright
laws and protection, it is uncertain what effect efforts by U.S. compa-
nies like Walt Disney actually will have on the crackdown against intel-
lectual property piracy.
B. Other Copyright Infringement Cases
In October 1994, a group of industry giants filed a joint lawsuit in
the Beijing Intermediate People's Court against a Chinese video dis-
tributor, Xianke Jiguang Market, alleging copyright infringement of
major films including such blockbusters as "The Godfather," "Rocky,"
and "Out of Africa." 253 These companies have alleged that Xianke is
selling laser-disk copies of these films without authorization as re-
quired under the 1991 Copyright Law, and they have demanded the
amount of lost sales, legal costs, and a guarantee that this behavior will
cease immediately. 254 This suit reinforces the understanding that
copyright protection has quickly risen to the top of many international
businesses' agendas.
As the demand in China for audiovisual entertainment related
products has grown recently, the market has been flooded with pirated
products. Yet, China has been slow to open the audiovisual market to
legitimate foreign products because the pirated products have been
easy to buy at very low prices. In fact, illegal copying and distribution
of copies of popular American videos is so widespread that Chinese
street hustlers were able to sell pirated-copies of Walt Disney's million
dollar movie "The Lion King" months before it was released on video
in the United States.2 55 Pirated materials are overwhelming the mar-
ket for such products as compact dics (CDs), computer software, and
videos. In response, even the Chinese people themselves have begun
250 Disney Unit Opening Hong Kong Office, RE]rrER Bus. REP., Dec. 13, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
251 Id. The area of the Asia Pacific includes such countries as Japan, China, Taiwan,
India, Australia, and New Zealand. Id.
252 Id. In one example of its campaign against counterfeiting, the company has run
advertisements in a local Malaysian newspaper that featured an "angry Mickey Mouse, with
the warning that the sale of unauthorized merchandise using Walt Disney characters is ille-
gal." Id.
253 Id. The companies that filed suit include Universal Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox,
United Pictures International, Paramount, Walt Disney Co., Columbia, Time Warner, and
Tri-Star. Id.
254 Id.
255 Time to Get Tough on China over Piracy, NEws TRIB., Jan. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
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to realize the damage copyright infringement can cause and have be-
gun to litigate such cases, if only to a limited extent.
For instance, on November 4, 1994, eleven Chinese writers filed
an infringement suit in the Beijing Intermediate People's Court alleg-
ing that Julin University Publishing House, a state-owned press in
northeast China, and its editor, Yuan Ye, illegally published nearly- a
hundred of their writings in a ten-book "Children's Series" without
their permission or consent.2 56 The plaintiffs are seeking an injunc-
tion against the publisher, an apology, and unspecified financial com-
pensation.2357 The timing of the suit is not surprising as Walt Disney is
currently waiting to hear the determination of the penalty in its
case.
2 58
C. Recent Software Lawsuits and Decisions
Walt Disney is not alone in its fight against China for enforcement
of intellectual property rights. U.S. businesses are beginning to act
both on their own and through industry groups. Despite the legal ob-
stacles of the Chinese court system, U.S. companies recently have be-
gun to aid in the fight against piracy by filing lawsuits in China against
copyright infringers.2 59 The Beijing Weihong Software Research Insti-
tute brought the first software copyright infringement suit against
Yuanwang Technology for displaying its software at a national com-
puter exhibition without permission from the copyright holder.260
The court settled the case in February 1993 and awarded Beijing
Weihong approximately $7,900 in damages.2 61 In December 1993, the
same court, the People's Court in Beijing's Haidian District, awarded
the East Computer Institute the largest award thus far, $36,206, for
software infringement by Zhuai Electronic Technology Development
Company.2 62
The Business Software Alliance (BSA), a Washington-based lobby-
ing group formed in 1988, is one of the major players in the effort by
U.S. software vendors to fight the war against copyright infringe-
256 Jeffrey Parker, New Ally in War on Copyright Theft: China Irctins, REUTER ASIA-PAc. Bus.
REP., Nov. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
257 Id.
258 Id The official China Daiy said the multi-plaintiff case "reflects the government's
determination to curb copyright violations" and suggested the timing was no accident. Id.
259 Software companies, including such giants as Microsoft, have begun to file suits
against infringing Beijing firms. Three U.S. Software Makers, Including Microsoft, Sue Chinese
Firms, AGENCa FR. PRESSE, Jul. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. In
order to step up efforts, Microsoft engineers have helped Chinese authorities with their inves-
tigations. Id.
260 Enforcement, supra note 150.
261 Id. The exact amount awarded was Rmb46,O00. Id.
262 Id. The Zhuai firm was convicted of marketing and copying software called Cross
Debugging Windows under another name. Id,
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ment.263 According to the BSA, in 1992 alone, software piracy gener-
ated sales of up to $12 billion worldwide and $5 billion in Asia.264
While the BSA has the power to investigate and raid Chinese busi-
nesses to uncover evidence of piracy on behalf of U.S. companies, the
organization has limited legal powers and, like a private citizen, must
take these cases to court and fund the cost itself.2 65 Nonetheless, the
goal of the BSA is to eradicate copyright infringement, which is an
increasingly expensive impediment to U.S. profits. In July 1994, the
BSA filed suit against five Beijing retailers on behalf of Microsoft, Lo-
tus Development, and Autodesk in the Intellectual Property Rights
Chamber under the Beijing Intermediate People's Court.2 66
The BSA and the individual companies claim that the Chinese
software companies were selling and displaying computers loaded with
pirated programs in the capital's Zhongguancun computer district-
Beijing's "Silicon Valley."267 The China Daily reported that the ten al-
leged incidents of copyright infringement may have cost the three
plaintiff companies millions in lost profits. 268 The companies are de-
manding between $10,000 and $30,000 for each copyright breach,
even though actual damages may be far higher.269 In June 1994, after
four months of plaintiffs trying to convince Chinese authorities that
copyright piracy was swallowing the software market, BSA officials
raided five large Chinese computer software retailers and seized more
than 300 pirated floppy disks and six hard disks to be used as evi-
dence. 270 The BSA has reported that this is just the first of many law-
suits to follow. 2 71 As a result of this precedent setting case, China's
General Administration of Customs and the State Council have begun
to draft regulations designed specifically to enforce the illegal import-
ing and exporting of pirated products and "to protect integrated cir-
263 China Software Piracy: Self Defense Best Choice for Victims, Bus. AsIA, July 20, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
264 Id. These figures represent 1992 sales but are based on the 1990 dollar. Id.
265 Id.
266 Three US. Software Makers, Including Microsoft, Sue Chinese Firms, supra note 259. Two
Microsoft engineers are working with the authorities to confiscate evidence and property for
the case. Id. A spokeswoman for Microsoft said very little about the case and remarked only
that Microsoft "encourages customers to use authorized software and welcomes the Chinese
government's moves to enable companies to sue over copyright violations." Id. Microsoft
estimates it has lost billions in copyright violations. Id.
267 Borros et al., supra note 223, at 40.
268 Microsoft, Lotus and Autodesk Allege Illegal Chinese Copying, CoMPUTERGRAM INT'L, Aug.
4, 1994, at sec. 2472, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
269 Id.
270 Id. These companies included Gaoli Computer Co., Sanhua Electronics, Huili Com-
puter Co., Huigin Computer Shop, and the Bejing branch of Giant Group, one of China's
largest computer software retailers. Id.
271 Id. According to Stephanie Mitchell, a Hong Kong-based Business Software Alliance
(BSA) Vice-President, this case should prove to be a step forward in the fight against software
piracy in China. Intellectual Property Protection in China: New Criminal Penalties for Copyright
Violators U.S. Software Producers'Lawsuit, E. AssAN ExEctrrvE RaP., Sept. 20, 1994, at 5, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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cuits and the transfer of scientific and technological research
findings."272
On June 30, 1994, the first of many raids on retailers of the pi-
rated goods that cost U.S. businesses more than $800 million last year
was initiated by the Clinton administration. 273 In order to avoid stiff
trade sanctions, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshef-
sky, after two days of meetings with Chinese officials including Foreign
Trade Minister Wu Y, ordered China to shut down twenty-six of its CD
factories having a production capacity of up to seventy-five million CDs
per year.2 7 4 Of these seventy-five million illegally produced CDs, sev-
enty million units are slated for export to other markets in Southeast
Asia.2 75 China initially responded by shutting down four factories and
six production lines, while re-registering and investigating the remain-
ing factories under question.2 76
In addition, the Chinese State Council, or cabinet, agreed to meet
regularly to develop ways to curb the widespread copyright infringe-
ment, and inspectors have been put out on the lookout for pirated
patents and trademarks, particularly in the audio, video, and computer
software markets. 277 Nevertheless, the Chinese government said that it
did not have the power to shut down all twenty-six factories and that
the U.S. companies currently affected should take legal action them-
selves against the infringers.2 78 Zhang Yuezhao, Deputy Director of
the Trade Ministry's Foreign Trade Department, indicated that the
Chinese Government could not take such unilateral action against the
factories because no administrative agency could legally issue such or-
ders since China is a country under the rule of law.279 The reality is
that China has failed in many of its promises to crack down on piracy.
By early 1995, the number of illegal factories in Guangdong producing
illegal CDs, cassettes, videos and software had grown to at least twenty-
nine, none of which had been shut down by the Chinese govern-
ment.2 80 China has not made any significant progress in developing its
enforcement procedures to the point at which it can deal with these
272 China's Piracy Woes Tarnish Image, supra note 152.
273 Borros et al., supra note 223, at 40. Despite the intentions of private U.S. companies
who hope to help curb the piracy problems through the court system, Chinese authorities
have been slow to respond to allegations of piracy with sweeps of the infringing stores. Id.
Some fear that the delays on the part of the judicial system give pirates a chance to destroy
crucial evidence. Id.
274 China CD Plants to Close or Face U.S. Sanctions, AsiA WALL ST.J.,July 22, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, Allnws Database.
275 Geoffrey Crothall, Beijing Rejects U.S. Demand to Close All CD Factories, S. CHINA Moa'-
ING PosT, July 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
276 Id.
277 China CD Plants To Close or Face U.S. Sanctions, supra note 274.
278 Id.
279 I1,L
280 Dede Nickerson, Threat of US-China Trade War Receding, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Jan.
22, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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problems effectively.281 Accordingly, U.S. companies continue to suf-
fer; meanwhile, the Chinese legal system has not served as a source of
relief at all until very recently.
For example, in 1993 Microsoft won a case against the Reflective
Materials Institute which was illegally manufacturing holograms pro-
tected under the copyright law.282 • Nevertheless, the guilty party was
fined only $260 for actual losses incurred by Microsoft estimated at
between $30 million and $180 million.283 That award later was raised
to $4,900, but as ofJuly 1994, Microsoft was still entangled in an appeal
to recover a more accurate award of $22 million. 284 Officials at
Microsoft estimate that, even today, for every one legal software pro-
gram sold in China there will be a hundred fakes. 28,5 It has been esti-
mated that in 1994 U.S. software publishers, including Microsoft, lost
$351 million in sales due to copyright piracy in China alone.286
Nevertheless, U.S. companies continue to pursue entrance into
China's legitimate market system because of its enormous potential.
For example, since 1992 and the signing of the MOU, Microsoft has
entered into a licensing agreement with the China Great Wall Com-
puter Group and other Chinese software groups in the hopes of com-
bating pirated MS-DOS products with legally protected versions. 287
Other U.S. software companies such as Borland, Digital Equipment,
and Software Systems Associates have followed suit and funneled
money and software into China through joint -ventures and foreign-
owned subsidiaries.288
V. Effect on RTade Between the United States and China,
A. In General
In a discussion on the fate of international intellectual property
rights, David Beier, Vice-President and General Counsel of Genetech,
Inc., estimated .that since World War II, the percentage of intellectual
property exported from the United States increased from eight to
twenty-five percent.289 In his opinion, the balance of payments and
281 See supra part I.
282 Mark O'Neil, China Defends Trademark Protection Record, RUTER AsiA-PAC. Bus. REP.,
Apr. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
283 ld.
284 Orenstein, supra note 238, at 2.
285 Tan L. Khoon, Enforcing Intellectual Property Law Takes More Than Going By the Book, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 13, 1994, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
286 Drawbaugh, supra note 238. The BSA estimates that U.S. software companies lost
$322 million in this sector in 1993 due to piracy, which is an increase from $225 million in
1992. Three U.S. Software Makers, Including Microsoft, Sue Chinese Firns, supra note 259.
287 Copyright, Bus. INT'L, CHINA HAND, Mar. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
288 Id. IBM set up a wholly owned subsidiary in China in 1992, and Unix Systems Labora-
tory formed a joint venture with Deshi Development Group of Hong Kong and six Chinese
Partners in November 1992. Id.
289 HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 265.
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trade deficit considerations have clearly pushed intellectual property
to the forefront of world trade issues.290 It is no secret that intellectual
property has become a major component of international trade, and as
Beier points out, its direct bearing on U.S. competitiveness and com-
merce has thrust it sharply into the world spotlight.291 It is estimated
that were it not for industries with a large concentration in intellectual
property the "U.S. trade deficit in 1988 would have been fifty-four
percent worse than the 109 billion dollars reported" by, the
government.292
In addition, the United States currently has a world trade surplus
in intellectual property, and in 1988, U.S. companies received $8 bil-
lion in royalties while paying out only $1.25 billion.2 93 During this
same time period, U.S. companies lost approximately $43 billion due
to piracy and counterfeiting.294 When President Clinton extended
China's low-tariff trading status2 9 5 on May 26, 1994, these crucial trad-
ing issues were thrown into the hot seat as $40 billion in two-way trade
was now at stake. 296 China is one of the ten largest developing markets
targeted for U.S. investment and export growth, but future trade
hinges on resolution of conflicts over market access and protection of
intellectual property rights.2 9 7 Although China has massive market po-
tential as a developing nation, it is still often vulnerable to the de-
mands and needs of other countries. Today, China continues to run a
trade surplus with the United States. 298 In fact, as China entered nego-
tiations with the United States over a threatened bilateral trade war, it
did so knowing that it could lose the U.S. market which imported al-
most $40 billion worth of goods in 1994.299
Since 1978, China has tried to "open the door" to foreign invest-
290 Id. at 265.
291 KINNEY & LANGE, OVERVIEW OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY FOR BUSINESS LAWYERs 125
(1992). See also HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 265.
292 HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 265.
293 Id. at 257.
294 Id.
295 One of the key features of being assigned Most Favored Nation (MFN) status is low
tariffs, and when President Clinton re-extended this status to China it once again helped
boost Chinese exports to the United States by cutting down taxes. SeeJ.T. Nguyen, Foreign
Investors Ignore Eastern Europe, UPI, Aug. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. With the renewal of China's MFN status in 1994, President Clinton essentially reiterated
the distinction between human rights and trade that his administration originally made in
June, 1993. Id.
296 Sheila Taft, US Delegation to Tackle Copyright Piracy in China, CHRusrtAN SCI. MONITOR,
Aug. 23, 1994, at 9. U.S.-China trade has witnessed significant growth over the last several
years, and in 1990, the total volume of bilateral trade hit $20 billion. Xiao-Lin, supra note 12,
at 1.
297 Xiao-Lin, supra note 12, at 1.
298 The imbalance of trade dollars with China rose 30% from 1993 to 1994. Santini,
supra note 156. The trade imbalance between the United States and China totalled $29.5
billion in 1994, which is second only to the $60 billion imbalance the United States had with
Japan. Id.
299 U.S.-China Reach Accord on 'Pirated Goods,'supra note 2.
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ment and consumerism by rebuilding ineffective parts of its economic
and political systems. 00 Chinese citizens have opened their pockets
and begun to exhibit their expansive consumer potential in markets
for both domestic and foreign goods. Industries are expanding at a
rapid pace, and American companies are looking at a total market of
over 1.2 billion people.301 The market potential in China is incredible,
and since 1949, over 400 million Chinese people have been born with-
out the deeply-rooted Communist ideological and cultural ties of the
past generations. 302 On any given day in Shanghai, there are three
million shoppers in a one- to two-mile commercial area,303 and yet, on
this same given day, there is copyright infringement, software piracy,
and intellectual property theft. In reality, despite vocal disapproval by
the U.S. government and private corporations, the state continues to
sell illegally pirated goods to local merchants to peddle on the main
streets of China's growing cities.304 These circumstances mandate that
China finally begin to enforce the new and stronger intellectual prop-
erty laws it worked so hard to create.
Introduction of the Copyright Law and the Software Regulations
were two noticeable steps taken by China in its effort to invite the rest
of the world to invest in China. As of yet, however, China has not en-
forced these laws.30 5 There has been sparse local border control, and
the government has yet to streamline its system for enforcement. A
1979 U.S.-China Trade Agreement originally obligated these power-
house countries to provide each other with equal intellectual property
right protection; yet, as of 1994, the goal had not been met.30 6 Dollars
are not the only thing at stake. Intellectual property rights piracy costs
industrialized countries more than money because the increased labor
and manufacturing costs stemming from infringement can make prod-
ucts in developed nations less competitive in the world market.30 7 In-
tellectual property pirates essentially reap all the profits and benefits
from other countries' hard work and research skills. Thus, the loss to
intellectual property right owners occurs on many levels.308 The copy-
right holder can lose revenues, the product's reputation for quality,
and goodwill.30 9 Also, industrialized societies as a whole suffer from
the decrease in the incentive of the population to develop new prod-
300 Marshall, supra note 19, at 543.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 545-46.
303 Girasa, supra note 49, at 305.
304 Kurtenbach, supra note 200, at DI.
305 See supra parts I and II.
306 Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4652.
307 Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round-Negotiating Strategies of the
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 1317, 1336 (1990).
308 Anne D. Waters, Trade, Intellectual Priperty and the Development of Central & Eastern
Europe: Filling the GATT Gap, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 943 (1993).
309 1.
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ucts. 3 10 The Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, an international in-
tellectual property intelligence bureau, estimated that pirated
products constitute eight percent of total world trade.31'
In 1986, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission directed the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission (USITC) to investigate the impact of
international piracy on world trade. The USITC reported that over
193 U.S. companies lost $23.8 billion, or 2.7% of total worldwide sales
of intellectual property-related goods to piracy.3 1 2 Of those, compa-
nies selling scientific and photographic goods reported the greatest
losses, at twenty-one percent of the total, while computers and software
were second at seventeen percent.313 According to the USITC study,
eighty-four companies cited evidence of losses due to copyright in-
fringement in a total of fifty-two states.s 14 The concerns often cited by
American companies were the lack of protection for American works,
an inaccessible system of formalities, and an ineffective system of en-
forcement and remedy.3 15
As piracy reduces the demand for the legitimate item, production
levels in the developed nations are affected. For example, the Business
Software Alliance reported that more than 17,400 additional jobs
would be created in the software industry in the European Union if
piracy were not destroying the demand for authorized software.3 16
The United States loses an estimated 210,000 jobs annually because
pirates erode a portion of international demand for legitimate
products. s17
Ultimately, these intellectual property piracy issues were what de-
termined China's reentry into the global trading market when the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolved into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. Entry into the
WTO has been one of China's leadership's most important goals in
recent history, but the U.S. government was able to block any attempt
by China to enter the WTO until it agreed to accept basic norms of
310 Id. at 943-44.
311 Robert Rice, The Real Fight in a Phoney War-Robert Rice Looks At the International Counter-
feit Trade, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at 18.
312 Gabriel E.L. Richerand, GATT, Intellectual Property Rights and the Developing Countries,
25 COPYRIGHT BuLL. 5 (1991). See also United States International Trade Commission, For-
eign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade:
Report to the United States Trade Representative, USITC Pub. 2065, Inv. No. 332-245, at 1-5
to 1-6, 3-5 to 3-6 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter USITC Study].
313 See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 101 n.73 (1993).
314 USITC Study, supra note 312, at 3-2.
315 Id. at 3-3 to 3-5.
316 European Industry Coalition Urges More EC Controls on Counterfeit Goods, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1103 (June 24, 1992).
317 Trish Donnally, Counterfeiters Cost Companies Jobs, Revenue; Consumer Has Little Recourse
STAR TRIB., June 3, 1992, at 1E. For example, in 1991 and 1992, Levi Strauss & Co. confis-




international commerce, most specifically strict enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights regulations. 3 18 In the long run, despite the in-
herent differences in the legal and political systems of the United
States and China, the strong economic bond between the two nations
requires that the issue of intellectual property protection and the re-
sulting trade disputes be resolved in a way that facilitates mutually ben-
eficial trade relations.
B. The U.S.-China Confrontation and Special 301
In the last decade, China has witnessed an explosion of change.
While it has tried to keep up with the rest of the world by enacting new
laws and regulations, it has not been successful at enforcement of these
new regulations. 319 As a result, China has been closely monitored by
the United States.
The United States has placed a great deal of emphasis on the pro-
tection of international intellectual property rights in the context of
international trade. The development and utilization of various trade
tools have played a crucially important role in maintaining the United
States' leverage in bilateral negotiations with China. One such effec-
tive tool, the Special 301 provision, was used recently by U.S. trade
representatives to persuade China to negotiate a fair settlement on the
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to avert what
could have been a devastating trade war.
320
The Special 301 provision was enacted by the U.S. Trade Commis-
sion as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.321
Special 301 is a subset of Super 301322 and is designed specifically to
address the inadequacies associated with foreign intellectual property
rights in developing countries and to increase U.S. bargaining power
in international trade negotiations. 32 3 Under Special 301, the USTR
each year must identify the foreign countries which deny "adequate
and effective protection of intellectual property rights," 324 or deny
"fair and equitable market access to United States persons who rely
upon intellectual property protection." 325 Finally, the USTR must des-
ignate "priority foreign countries" which are countries:
i) whose acts, practices, or policies are most onerous and egregious
318 Thomas Friedman, American Business Is Seeing the Light About Rule of Law in China,
INT'L HERALD Tma., Jan. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
319 See supra part II.C.
320 See Sadler, supra note 15, at 422. The threat of trade sanctions by the U.S. often has
been used successfully to secure bilateral agreements for intellectual property rights protec-
tion. Id.
321 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C. app.).
322 J
323 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (a)(1), (b)(10)(A) (1988).
324 Id. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1988).
325 Id. § 2242 (a)(1)(B) (1988).
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[against intellectual property owners] ;326
ii) and have the greatest adverse economic impact on the United
States;3 2
7
iii) and which are not entering into good faith negotiations or mak-
ing significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to pro-
vide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights.3 28
Thirty days after the designation of the "priority" countries, the
USTR must begin to investigate the acts, practices, and policies of
those countries, 3 2 9 unless such investigations would be detrimental to
U.S. economic interests.3 30 The USTR has six months to investigate
and negotiate bilateral solutions.3 3 1 At the end of the investigation
period, if no substantially positive change has occurred and the nation
in question is violating any trade agreements or is unjustifiably burden-
ing U.S. commerce, the USTR may retaliate by imposing trade sanc-
tions, import duties, or other economic restrictions, under the
direction of the President.3 3 2
In 1990, China was placed on the "priority watch list" for the first
time because of its ineffective enforcement of intellectual property
right laws, its lack of a formal copyright law, and its deficient patent
law.333 The "watch list" was established by the USTR to provide a mod-
ified approach to compliance with Special 301 in the hopes that the
nation in question would correct the problems before they escalated to
a level of severity that would mandate designation as a "priority foreign
country."3a 4 Under the support of the Clinton administration, the
USTR has added "immediate action plans" and "out-of-cycle reviews"
to supplement the current Special 301 procedure.33 5 These two addi-
tions provide deadlines and guidelines for the USTR when monitoring
a country's on-going progress on intellectual property issues as well as
periodic reviews to prevent the inconvenience associated with having
only annual proceedings.33
6
On April 26, 1991, the USTR identified China as a "priority for-
eign country" because:
326 I& § 2242 (b)(1)(A) (1988).
327 Id. § 2242 (b)(1)(B) (1988).
328 Id. § 2242 (b)(1)(C) (1988).
329 Id. §§ 2242 (a)(2), 2412 (b)(2) (1988).
330 Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1988).
331 Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1988). Upon conclusion of the six months, trade officials
can grant a 90 day extension at their discretion. Id.
332 Id § 2411(a) (1), (c) (1988). The USTR may impose these restrictions or sanctions
against all the products from the offending country, not only the products involved in the
investigation. Id. § 2411(c) (3).
333 US. China Agreement on Intellectual Property Ends Retaliatory Duties Threat, 43 Pat. Trade-
mark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 1074, at 95 (Jan. 23, 1992).
334 M. Jean Anderson et al., Intellectual Prperty Protection in the Americas: The Baiers Are
Being Removed, 4 J. PROPRIETARY Ris. 2 (1992), available in WESTLAW, Jlr Database, at * 15.
335 See US.T.R. Fact Sheet on Special 301 Released Api 30, 1993, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 18, at 761 (May 5, 1993).
336 See id. at 762.
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China is our only major trading partner to offer neither product pat-
ent protection for pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, nor copy-
right protection for U.S. works. In addition, trademarks are granted
to the first registrant in China, regardless of the original owner. Trade
secrets are not adequately protected in China. As a result, piracy of all
forms of intellectual property is widespread in China, accounting for
significant losses to U.S. industries.8 37
This event marked the first time any country had officially been put on
the list as a "priority foreign country."338 The Chinese government
struggled with the U.S. government to come to an agreement or find
a working solution. The United States is China's biggest trading
partner, and to avoid the trade sanctions the USTR was threatening,
China bowed to the pressure. On January 17, 1992, the night before
the United States was to begin institution of import tariffs on Chinese
products, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the United States regarding key intellectual property matters.3 39
The MOU became a formal bilateral copyright agreement when the
U.S. President proclaimed under 17 U.S.C. § 104(b) (5) that there
would be reciprocal copyright protection between the two
countries.3 40
Ultimately, China formally promised that it would improve its cur-
rent copyright system and protect copyrighted works, including
software, for fifty years and join the major international intellectual
property rights conventions. 341 At that point, U.S. trade officials re-
vealed the three-step investigation as required under the provisions of
Special 301: (1) "China must immediately and effectively take steps to
shut down wholesalers, manufacturers, and retailers of pirated software
and CDs"; (2) China must enforce the rules against intellectual prop-
erty piracy; and (3) China must take steps to ensure laws are visible. 342
Yet, China failed in its promise to enforce its laws and regulations and
the level of piracy skyrocketed.3M 3 As a result, on June 30, 1.994, USTR
Mickey Kantor placed China on the Special 301 "priority watch list,"
giving the nation six months to enforce laws protecting intellectual
property rights, most specifically the copyright protection legisla-
337 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet 1 (Apr. 26, 1991).
38 See Anderson et al., supra note 334, at 95.
339 Durney, supra note 24, at 316.
340 United States Extends Copyright Protection to Works Published in China, Pat. Trademark &
CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 1074, at 456 (Mar. 26, 1992). See supra notes 29-30 and accompany-
ing text.
341 Waters, supra note 308, at 959. China also agreed to provide patents for chemicals
and pharmaceuticals. Id. As ofJuly 1992, China joined the Berne Convention and the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention. Id.
342 Duncan Hughes, US. Sets Terms for Mainland on Piracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
18, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
343 Summary by U.S. Trade Representative of US.-China Intellectual Property Accord Released Feb.
26, 1995, [July-December) Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 442-43 (Mar. 1, 1995) [hereinaf-
ter Summary by US. Trade Representative].
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tion.3 44 At that time, the U.S. government warned that if China did
not significantly alter its practices by December 31, 1994, unless given a
legal 90-day extension, it would face trade sanctions for copyrighted
goods valued at $800 millionM45 China responded by raiding Chinese
firms and seizing pirated goods including 200,000 CDs and 750,000
video and audio tapes, resulting in the arrest of 7,000 people and the
closing of fifty-six illegal factories.3 46 According to the U.S. govern-
ment, these actions were not enough. U.S. negotiators broke off talks
with China on December 14, 1994, after the Chinese government
failed to close down twenty-nine factories that were linked to the pro-
duction of over $75 million in pirated CDs, cassettes, videos and
software.3 47
On January 1, 1995, U.S. trade officials determined that after
eighteen months of negotiations and efforts, China had failed to en-
force the protection of intellectual property rights within the coun-
try.3 48  USTR Mickey Kantor announced that if after further
negotiations the two countries could not resolve these pressing issues
by February 4, 1995, the United States would impose prohibitive tariffs
on Chinese exports totalling almost $2.8 billion.3 49 Given the history
between the two countries and what was at stake, experts reported that
it was likely that some measure of agreement would be reached before
any serious tariffs and/or penalties would be imposed.35 0  Robert
Kapp, President of the U.S.-China Business Council in Washington, re-
ported that the "experience we have had with the Chinese in the past is
that you have to get far down the road (with threats of retaliation)
before you reach a settlement."351 Negotiators from China and the
United States met unsuccessfully on January 21, 1995, and again on
January 24, 1995, to discuss resolution of three major issues: the clo-
sure of manufacturing facilities of illegally pirated goods, software pro-
tection, and the question of whether or not the government will
provide Chinese consumers with the necessary market access to legiti-
mate goods.35 2 However, talks were suspended on January 30, 1995,
344 Walters, supra note 140, at DI.
345 Under § 301 sanctions, China could face sanctions equal to the approximate dollar
amount lost by U.S. companies from piracy. Id. In this case, $800 million represents the
estimated losses that U.S. companies suffered in 1993. Id.
346 Disney Wins Copyright Suit Against Chinese Companies; The Precedent-Setting Case was the
First Publication Lawsuit filed by a U.S. company in China, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 1994, at
Bi.
347 Nickerson, supra note 280.
348 Time to Get Tough on China Over Piracy, NEws TRIB., Jan. 5, 1995, at A10. One billion




351 U.S. to List Items for China Trade Sanctions, SAN DI.cO UNION-T~RB., Dec. 29, i994, at
Cl.
352 Nickerson, supra note 280.
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because of China's seven-day lunar New Year holiday.
On February 4, 1995, Kantor announced another harsh deadline
for the Chinese. He stated that 100% duties would be imposed on $1.8
billion worth of Chinese imports, the steepest tariff punishment ever
threatened by the U.S. government, at midnight on February 26, 1995,
if no concrete agreement and action could be reached before that
time.353 In response, Chinese Trade Minister Wu Yi set up another
round of negotiations in Beijing on February 13, 1995. In addition,
China made retaliatory threats to counter-sanction with 100% punitive
duties on various U.S. products such as alcohol, tobacco products, cos-
metics, automobiles, and others 54 Furthermore, China threatened to
suspend talks on the increase of U.S. investments in China, to suspend
ties with several U.S. trade associations, and to suspend negotiations on
many joint venture projects with the United States.355
Meanwhile, trade representatives from the United States contin-
ued to offer their support and to express their frustration with this
prolonged fight for protection; but China had already become a "pi-
rate's market."356 In fact, many have considered China to be the
"world's worst pirate."357 The President of the International Intellec-
tual Property Alliance, Eric Smith, has said that: "[i] n terms of the rate
of the piracy, it is the worst in the world right now, and in this country
it is growing and uncontrolled."3 58 Smith rejected China's defense
that U.S. companies have failed to file civil suits to enforce copyright
protection in China, citing examples of many companies that have
tried and failed, on more than one occasion, to seek redress through
China's legal system, including such powerful and resourceful organi-
zations as Disney and Microsoft. 35 9
The world waited eagerly to see whether the United States ulti-
mately would engage in a major Pacific trade war, knowing that sanc-
tions could no longer be avoided if China continued to ignore the
353 Drawbaugh, supra note 238. The top five areas of Chinese exports to the United
States targeted by the USTR for the 100% duties are as follows: (1) miscellaneous plastic
articles ($465 million); (2) answering machines and cellular phones ($108 million); (3)
sporting goods ($78 million); (4) wooden articles ($70 million); and (5) bicycles with wheels,
20 inches or smaller ($65 million). Kurtenbach, supra note 200, at DI. In sum, 35 categories
of imports from China were chosen, including confectionery, citric acid, rubber gloves, gold
and platinum jewelry, copper articles, greeting cards, and others. ld. These goods were cho-
sen under a complex system designed to avoid hurting U.S. consumers or businesses. Making
War on China's Pirates, supra note 18, at 33.
354 ld. The Chinese have made counter-threats because of the more than $32.4 billion
at stake (China's current export level with the United States). See U.S. to List Items for China
Trade Sanctions, supra note 351, at Cl.
355 Id.
356 China bought software worth $1 million in 1994, averaging only $1 per desktop com-
puter, the lowest rate in the world today. See id.
357 Jeffrey Parker, U.S. Industries Call China The Top Copyright Thief, REUrFR ASiA-PAc. Bus.
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increasingly devastating intellectual property rights crisis situation.
What China had accomplished since its citation as a Special 301 "prior-
ity country" was not sufficient to satisfy the concerns of the U.S. gov-
ernment or U.S. companies currently doing or wanting to do business
in China. Unfortunately, many trade officials acknowledged that no
matter what happened, the situation would not be easy to remedy be-
cause of the massive structural changes that would have to take place
within China.3 60 John Kamm, an American business consultant in
China, summarized the situation: "When you ask China's leaders to
observe basic trade norms, you are asking them to institute commercial
laws, independent courts, anti-corruption measures, and equal treat-
ment for foreigners."3 6 1
The world got its answer by February 26, 1995. A last-minute deal
by the Chinese government averted what promised to have been one
of the greatest trade wars in American history. According to President
Clinton, in addition to signing the agreement and making concessions
to all U.S. demands, China backed away from its threats of retaliation,
including the threats to cease the current negotiations with the three
big U.S. automakers planning to open new production facilities in the
Chinese market within the next year.3 62 Under this new agreement,
China formally agreed to mount a crackdown on intellectual property
pirates through efforts such as shutting down seven of the twenty-nine
factories making counterfeit movies and CDs, destroying more than
two million tapes and CDs, confiscating 30,000 fake computer discs in
the city's Zhongguacun District (the Chinese "Silicon Valley"), and
raiding an eighth illegal CD factory as the agreement was being
signed.3 63 USTR Mickey Karitor was pleased with the outcome and re-
marked that the agreement will "have an enormous impact in ex-
panding U.S. export-oriented jobs."3 64 In addition, Kantor remarked
that this new agreement should help China in its bid for entrance to
the WTO.3 65
The pact was hammered out in detail over the weeks following its
signing, and its final form completed on March 12, '1995, consisted of
three crucial areas. First, under the settlement, the Chinese govern-
360 Thomas Friedman, American Business is Seeing the Light About Rule of Law in China,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 9,-1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
361 Id.
362 Jim Landers, U.S.-China Pact Ends Taiff Threat; Piracy Agreement Reverts Trade War, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 1995, at DI.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Santini, supra note 156. If China had already been a member of GATT or the WTO,
the U.S. would not have been able to make these unilateral trade sanctions. Right to Punish
China, supra note 13, at 16. In that case, American sanctions would not have been legal until
GATT or the WTO had administered a complaint against China and determined just com-
pensation. Id. However, U.S. sanctions might have been unnecessary in that scenario be-
cause China would have been' bound by the rigorous regulations and requirements of GATT
or the WTO. Id.
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ment has agreed to take the following immediate action and allocate
resources in order to combat piracy: (1) implement a Special Enforce-
ment Period3 66 in which government resources will be used specifically
to cleanup large-scale producers and distributors of infringing prod-
ucts; (2) shut down all illegal counterfeit CD factories within three
months and destroy any machinery used to produce such goods; and
(3) provide stricter border control to prevent the exportation of illegal
products. 36 7
Secondly, the pact deals with long-term enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights including the following actions:
1) ensure that the Chinese government will use adequate resources to
prevent and punish the unauthorized use of legitimate software and
other intellectual property goods,
2) establish a strong intellectual property enforcement structure that
includes:
a) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) conference working groups
at all levels of government to carry out enforcement efforts,
b) IPR enforcement task forces under each working group that
have the actual power and authority to carry out enforcement
efforts,
c) cross-jurisdictional enforcement efforts carried out
cooperatively,
d) a Customs enforcement system modeled on the U.S. customs
service,
e) a title verification system to prevent the illegal production, dis-
tribution, importation, exportation and retail sale of U.S. audiovi-
sual works that includes participation by U.S. right holders within
the Chinese borders,
f) focused enforcement efforts against the infringement of audio-
visual works, computer programs, and publications,
g) equal treatment of U.S. right holders in the Chinese judicial
system, including international treatment for civil filing fees, ex-
peditious handling of IPR cases by foreigners, and prevention of
the destruction of evidence of infringement while a case is
pending,
h) establishment of a statistical system that monitors and reports
to the U.S. the level of Chinese enforcement efforts on a regular
basis together with a schedule of regular meetings between the
two countries to monitor the adequacy of such efforts,3 68
i) enhanced training mechanisms offered to judges, lawyers, stu-
366 Under the agreement's action plan, this special enforcement period began on March
1, 1995, as all intellectual property enforcement agencies in China were asked to increase the
pursuit and prosecution of violations for at least the next six months. Business Beams on IPR
Breakthrough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 17, 1995, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
Such action will include regular raids on retail outlets suspected of selling pirated goods,
and imposition of steep penalties against plants that produce such illegal goods. See U.S.-
China Reach Accord on 'Pirated' Goods, supra note 2.
367 Summary by U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 343, at 442.
368 Id. China and the United States will exchange this information on a quarterly basis
beginning on June 1, 1995. Business Beams on IPR Breakthrough, supra note 366, at 7.
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dents, government officials, and businesspersons on the nature
and importance of intellectual property protection, and
3) strict enforcement of all laws and regulations.3 69
Finally, the Chinese government has agreed to provide greater ac-
cess to U.S. right holders, including a commitment to: (1) place no
quotas on the importation of U.S. audiovisual products; (2) eliminate
the ten works per year limit on audiovisual products and instead guar-
antee U.S. record companies complete access to market their entire
catalog of works subject only to censorship laws; and (3) allow U.S.
intellectual property-related companies (including software compa-
nies) to enter into joint venture arrangements for the production, re-
production, distribution, and sale of their products in Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and eventually eleven other cities by the year 2000.370
Software companies hurt by Chinese pirating practices were ex-
cited over the results. Robert Holleyman, head of the Business
Software Alliance, reported that the pact signaled an "explicit demon-
strable commitment to the protection of intellectual property, includ-
ing software."3 7 1  But others are not as impressed. Frank Wang,
General Counsel for Computer Associates, a major New York software
firm, is skeptical about how effective the pact will ultimately be. He
challenges those who think the pact will take care of the problem and
characterizes them as "naive," stating that the Chinese have not con-
verted, but are only "in the church" to hear the United 'States
preach.3 72 Regardless of predictions, it has become clear that the Chi-
nese government can no longer afford not to have the United States as
an economic ally. From 1984 to 1994, yearly exports from the United
States to China rose from $3 billion to $8.8 billion, and Chinese ex-
ports to the United States' rose from. $3.1 billion to almost $38
billion. 3 73
The United States is clearly pleased with the concessions it
achieved on every major point in the dispute. In fact, President Clin-
ton released a statement on February 26, 1995, in which he said that
the pact will mean "thousands ofjobs for Americans in key industries,
including computer software, pharmaceuticals, agricultural and chemi-
cal products, books and periodicals, and audiovisual products."3 74 Fur-
369 Business Beams on IPR Breakthrough, supra note 366, at 7.
370 Id.; see also Landers, supra note 362, at D1.
371 Santini, supra note 156.
372 Landers, supra note 362, at D2.
373 Summary by U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 343. The Chinese have become very
dependent upon the U.S. market as 30% of China's exports went to the United States last
year; only Japan has a bigger bilateral trade surplus with America. Trade Peace; Deja Vu Again,
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995, at 73.
374 U.S.-China Reach Accord on 'Pirated' Goods, supra note 2. According to trade officials,
the pact will positively effect the ability of U.S. intellectual property-related companies to
work and protect their legally-guaranteed rights in China and Asia, which will ultimately lead
to the creation of more U.S. jobs in some of the most up-and-coming industries of the U.S.
economy. Summary by U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 343.
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thermore, the pact promises to reduce the level of pirating of movies,
software, music, and CDs which will encourage U.S. companies to
move into the growing and dynamic Chinese market. However, trade
officials know this is only the first step. As China comes closer to curb-
ing piracy and to entering the WTO, it will have to act quickly to en-
force its promises, an action that may very well strengthen the global
trading system.375
C. International Trade Bargaining Tools-WlO
If the last year has proven anything, it is that the United States has
a powerful arsenal of bargaining tools that it can and will bring to the
international trade table. In addition to Special 301, trade officials
have acknowledged that China acquiesced in large part due to the
agreement by the United States to rescind its block against the en-
trance of China into the WTO, the global trade-monitoring body that
came into being January 1, 1995.376 Until recently, the United States
had vehemently blocked China's entrance into GATT, the predecessor
to the WTO, arguing that China should be treated as a developed
country and should be forced to enforce its intellectual property rights
provisions before entering the world group.37 7
The feeling of the United States was that China possessed an ex-
port potential and level of world trade comparable to most major
world players, and thus that they should not be given preferential treat-
ment or the extension of transition time given to developing na-
tions.378 According to Long Yongtu, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Economy and Trade, excessive expectations of market openings due to
the reduction of trade barriers are "not realistic," and those involved in
the negotiations with China should take a realistic stance on China and
its progress. 379 Yet Miao Fuchun, GATT spokesperson, suggested that
the continued rejection of China's bid for entry into that organization
eventually could mean bad news for the entire international system of
trade, investment, and development as a whole.380 If China was not
bound by the WTO, all international trade agreements and conven-
tions made over the last eight years essentially would be nullified.381
From the beginning, GAT[ was born from the idea that eventually
worldwide trade would be tariff free and international competition
would be equitable among all nations.382 GATT was also a mechanism
375 Trade Peace; Deja Vu Again, supra note 373.
376 See Id.
377 See A Lasting Trade Peace with China?, CI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1995, at 24.
378 Bhushan Bahree, U.S. and China Locked Again in Trade Clash, Asian Wall St. J.,July 5,
1994, available in WESTLAW, Allnws Database.
379 China's Piracy Woes Tarnish Image, supra note 152.
380 Ruth Youngblood, China Balks At Demands to Halt CD Makers, UPI,July 27, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
381 Id.
382 Richerand, supra note 312, at 4.,
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to which western nations eager to bolster international trade turned
for effective intellectual property protection and for enforcement on
an international scale.38 3 These countries turned to GATI because
most felt that the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
could not offer a dispute resolution mechanism that could be used for
intellectual property disputes involving trade. 384 The United States in
particular looked to GATT, because it wanted "to see its domestic rules
on authorship reflected in foreign legislation," so that U.S. authors
would receive protection and remuneration in Europe as well as the
United States. 38 5 At the time, GATT was the only institution that was
able to provide a mechanism for imposing sanctions for failure to sat-
isfy the agreed upon international regulations. 386 However, the pres-
ence of GATT, now the newly-formed WTO, has served in this case to
be more a bargaining tool wielded by the United States than a means
by which to help curb rampant piracy in China.
The United States, in particular, wrapped itself in the power of
GATT to try to combat intellectual property rights violations around
the world, because of the large losses it had suffered at the hands of
pirates. For example, as of 1986 the U.S. publishing industry was los-
ing $1.3 billion annually, and the worldwide computer software indus-
try was losing nearly $500 million annually.3 87 Also, in 1994, U.S.
software makers estimated that at least ninety-four percent of all com-
puter programs sold in China were pirated. 388 Many governments, in-
33 Waters, supra note 308, at 948-49. Westerners looked to GATT to provide the trade
incentives not available in the world treaties governing international relations at the time
that would give these nations more bargaining power on the trade table. Id. at 949-50.
384 Gutterman, supra note 313, at 108-09.
385 Anna Morner, The GATT Uruguay Round and Copyright, 25 COPYRIGHT BULLETIN 7, 9
(No. 2, 1991).
386 Id. While intellectual property rights issues were not initially included in the core of
the GATT provisions, the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU) helped to
bring the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to the negotiating
table of the Uruguay Round by the late 1980s. Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, Inter-
national Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
285, 290-92 (1989). According to the experts, the objective of these and future discussions
was to "prevent distortions in international trade, to promote effective protection for intellec-
tual property rights and to ensure that trade policy measures designed to deal with pirate
activities do not interfere with legitimate trade." Morner, supra note 385, at 7. By the end of
1989, the TRIPS proposals presented by negotiators included eight substantive regulations
and six rules for enforcement which outlined a minimum level of guaranteed protection for
intellectual property rights. Id. at 9. The countries laid out a proposed minimum set of
standards that GATT should set in place for the protection against copyright infringement.
The minimum protection under the proposed regulations include the following rights: a) to
guarantee the author's exclusive right to reproduce protected works in any manner or form;
b) to translate, adapt, arrange or edit the protected work in any way; c) to distribute copies of
such works, including their sale, hire and importation; and d) to communicate the work to
the public by any means. Richerand, supra note 312, at 6.
87 Richerand, supra note 312, at 5.
888 James Cox, Message to Bootleggers in China: Just Don't Do It, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1995,
at lB. In 1994, it is estimated that U.S. companies lost $866 million in the following indus-
tries: Software ($351 million); Recordings ($345 million); Music & Books ($120 million);
and Video ($50 million). Id.
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cluding China's, still maintained great control over the content of
their laws and the level of enforcement that would be afforded to
them. These practices too often left the rights of foreigners vulnerable
to violation, if not completely unprotected.389
On July 28, 1994, GATT" convened its 18th session to discuss
readmitting China, one of its founding countries.3 90 This reentry into
GATT has proven to be an important weapon in the fight by the
United States to encourage reform in China's copyright system. China
initially left the trade organization when the Communists rose to
power and since 1986, have been trying to reenter GAT[ and its suc-
cessor the WTO. 3 9 1 As recently as December 1994, the United States
had successfully blocked any attempt by China to enter the WTO.39 2
Now, with the new pact signed and China seemingly eager to enforce
its laws, the situation has changed. On the weekend of March 11,
1995, when the details of the agreement were formally laid out in Bei-
jing, USTR Mickey Kantor noted that the United States was now "realis-
tically" considering China's bid for entry into the WTO.3 93 Kantor
acknowledged that while China is a "dynamic, fast-growing economic
power," it should be treated as a "hybrid" member and excluded from
some rules in specific circumstances so that it would be able to build its
economy up to the WTO standards.3 94 While today the outlook is posi-
tive and Kantor and other U.S. trade officials hope this is the dawn of a
new era, onlookers remain skeptical, citing the past history of a Chi-
nese government that makes promises and signs agreements only to
back out once it has received what it needs.3 95 But officials hope that
once China is inside the WTO, fellow members and the organization as
a whole will force China to "play by the same rules."396
On March 11, 1995, Mickey Kantor and Wu Yi, China's Foreign
Trade Minister, hammered out an eight-point agreement that entailed
U.S. sponsorship of China into the WTO in exchange for a lifting of
quotas and licensing requirements on agrarian goods, and the formali-
zation of a three-part landmark agreement to curb piracy within
China.3 97 As the United States prepares to recommend China for en-
389 Waters, supra note 308, at 948-49.
390 China's Piracy Woes Tarnish Image, supra note 152, at *1-*2.
391 Id.
392 U.S.-China Reach Accord on 'Pirated' Goods, supra note 2.
393 A Lasting Trade Peace with China?, supra note 377.
394 Id. According to the Chinese government, if China was to enter with some of the
benefits of a developing nation it could gradually lower tariffs, reform its economy, and boost
the wealth of its country to meet the level of a developed country at a heightened pace. Id.
395 Id.
396 Uli Schmetzer, Optimism on China Trade Accords, Cm. TPmi., Mar. 14, 1995, at 3. For
example, as a member of the WTO, China could no longer use political and criminal detain-
ees as slave labor, and Beijing would be forced to conform to international labor rules, as
well. Id.
397 Id. The two sides also agreed to set standards for fruit and wheat imports that China
must accept, and they also agreed to the joint launching of commercial satellites. Id.
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try into the global trading organization, Chinese officials have reas-
signed one million people from the courts to the police to help
enforce rules prohibiting the piracy that threatened to become one of
the worst problems in a sea of international trade issues. 398
VI. Concluding Remarks
The international trade situation has been and will continue to be
an explosive source of conflict and power among nations. China, now
a major world player, will be forced to keep up with the consequences
of such issues. It appears that, like the country that enacted them, the
Chinese Copyright Law and Software Regulations will continue to de-
velop with major speed and impact. However, now, the focus no
longer is on creation of these new laws but rather on the enforcement
of them.399 The outlook is hopeful but uncertain, as the local political
environment in China continues to hinder reform, and a renewed in-
terest in black-market copying and pirating activities thrives among a
controlling segment of the population. 400 Yet, unlike in the past, the
United States will no longer accept a "wait and see" approach. 40 1
The time has come for China to prove its commitment to overall
reform, and the nation has been put to the test repeatedly. Having
faced its biggest challenge with the threat of a crippling $1.8 billion in
tariffs, China appears ready to conform to the rigid world intellectual
property rights standards. Too much is at stake for the Chinese not to
change. They face the opportunity for billions of dollars in invest-
ments, joint ventures, and new product imports from the United States
and countries around the world. As a result, the Chinese government
has made its first real efforts towards destroying the black-market econ-
omy that has corrupted and stolen from the legitimate markets on the
streets of Beijing and beyond. This commitment includes its promise
of more stringent enforcement of its copyright law and the solid agree-
ment signed on February 26, 1995, and delivered March 11, 1995.402
U.S. companies can no longer afford the millions of dollars they lose
each year to copyright infringement, and China can no longer afford
to risk losing the major economic countries as allies.4 03 China wants
desperately to solidify its presence in the international marketplace
through entrance into the WTO, and the United States literally holds
398 Id.
399 The U.S. and China have been engaged in trade talks for over a year because China
has not been able to provide reliable copyright protection. Ideas Follow Trade, supra note 21.
According to commentators, the greatest source of tension is not the laws themselves but the
open disregard for their enforcement. Id.
400 See Gutterman, supra note 313, at 124.
401 Durney, supra note 24, at 319.
402 See supra part V.B.
403 In 1993, multinational corporations poured $26 billion in direct investment into
China as a developing nation. Foreign Investors Ignore Eastern Europe, UPI, Aug. 31, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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the key. Progress by the Chinese has been slow, because both legally
and economically, the Chinese government has gotten itself in a catch-
22 situation. The Chinese government wants to curb piracy and copy-
right infringement, but it does not want the enforcement of rights to
be a tool that will strangle the economic development of their country.
China knows that it has become a courted nation, and in an effort
to maximize on its potential, it has begun to play a game of cat and
mouse with many nations. Both the United States and China acknowl-
edge that piracy has gotten out of control, and companies are losing
billions of dollars each year. The United States is serious about curb-
ing piracy in China, and China is serious about preventing the United
States from making any unilateral trade sanctions. The hallmark
agreement signed recently by the two nations should prove to be the
catalyst by which both achieve these important goals.4°4
It is only fair to say that China has come a long way. It has devel-
oped some of the most sophisticated copyright and software regula-
tions in the world. Yet, while'it has made many efforts to curb piracy in
its country, it has only scratched the surface. The recently signed pact
proves that for the first time China has formally acknowledged this
weakness. As the third-largest economy in the world, the Chinese can
stop their rampant piracy epidemic; they should stop it, and now they
find themselves as a nation being forced to stop it. China has cracked
open its door to U.S. companies wider than ever before but many still
have their doubts. Until there is full market access and strict enforce-
ment, piracy threatens to abound.
In summary, it is evident that the Copyright Law of 1991 and the
Software Regulations were created by a government with an eye to the
future. These newly-enacted laws are some of the most comprehen-
sively drafted laws of their kind in the world.405 Without a doubt, they
will more than meet WTO standards if they are rigorously enforced.
But only today has the Chinese government begun to enforce them. A
clear example of lax enforcement is the case brought in China by Walt
Disney.406 In August of 1994, Walt Disney won what should have been
a landmark case. The guilty verdict should have changed the face of
intellectual property rights protection in China, but it has not. As of
April 1995, no penalty has been assessed, and there is no indication as
to when this will happen. 4°7 Unfortunately, what this case of poten-
tially epic proportions might become is another statistic of the Chinese
legal system, another copyright case that makes it to court but leaves
the violated party empty handed.408
404 See supra part V.B.
405 See supra parts IIA and II.C.2. See also supra part III.B.
406 See supra part IVA
407 See supra part IVA
408 Lawyers in the Chinese court system are undertrained and the courts are ill-equipped
to perform the investigative work necessary to adjudicate properly the cases that come before
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Unfortunately, all the U.S. government can do is watch. Can
Microsoft and Disney afford to exit the Chinese market as it continues
to grow economically, as consumer spending power continues to esca-
late, and as the door to opportunity continues to open that much fur-
ther? This is a question that only those companies can answer with any
certainty. In the meantime, the U.S. government has found itself ask-
ing the very same questions. Can the U.S. afford to leave the Chinese
market if the Chinese fail to uphold their end of the newly signed
agreement? Or will such an exit leave both nations at a bigger disad-
vantage than ever before? In any case, the reality remains that in the
next two to five years the United States will witness some of the most
significant international trade events the world has faced in the last
decade, as this powerhouse nation called China adjusts, modifies, and
revamps its economic and legal systems. The United States and the
People's Republic of China, which may well be inextricably bound in
mutual economic dependency, will continue to shape the landscape of
world trade.
Awy E. SIMPSON
them. See Orenstein, supra note 135, at 2. While courts have stepped up their level of en-
forcement, the fact remains that U.S. companies very rarely are compensated properly for
the damage done by pirates. Enforcement, supra note 150. Ultimately, U.S. companies find
themselves alone in their efforts to ensure enforcement of China's new copyright laws, as
affected businesses in other countries, including Japan, seem to be staying out of the piracy
confrontation. See Schmetzer, supra note 137, at 1.
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